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EXAMINING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
EXPERIENCE IN ADOPTING THE
SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR
MODEL
Eilís Ferran∗
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n major markets around the world there has been a growing trend towards unification of responsibility for the regulation of banks, securities markets, and insurance companies.1 Countries where a unified agenc y has recently assumed
regulatory responsibilities for all financial institutions include
the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), Japan, and Korea.2 In May 2002,
Germany established a single financial regulator.3 Ireland and
Switze rland are also in the process of moving towards the single
regulator model.4 The increasing popularity of the single regulator model in Europe should be viewed against the background
∗ Eilís Ferran, Reader in Corporate Law and Financial Regulation and
Director of the Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law (3CL), University of
Cambridge, United Kingdom. E-mail: evf1000@cam.ac.uk.
I am grateful for comments from Kern Alexander, Chris Bates, Rod
Cantrill, James Fanto, Niamh Moloney, Tolek Petch, and participants at the
Brooklyn Law School Symposium Do Financial Supermarkets Need Super
Regulators?, September 20, 2002. This Article reflects the position as of September 2002, but with occasional references to more recent material.
1. Kenneth K. Mwenda & Alex Fleming, International Developments in
the Organizational Structure of Financial Services Supervision, Paper Presented at the World Bank Financial Sector Vice-Presidency Seminar, at 1
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org.
2. NEIL COURTIS, HOW COUNTRIES S UPERVISE THEIR BANKS, INSURERS AND
S ECURITIES M ARKETS xiii (2d ed. 2002). Although Courtis classifies Australia
as a single regulator country, its approach is distinctive in that it divides between two agencies responsibility for prudential regulation (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority) and for conduct of business (Australian Securities and Investment Commission). The Netherlands is considering the adoption of a similar cross-sectoral, objective-driven model. See Annet Jonk et al.,
A New Dutch Model, 6 FI N. REG. 35 (2001).
3. Hugh Williamson, Boost for Germany’s Financial Role: Federal Agency
Three Regulatory Bodies to be Merged into Single Authority from May 1, FI N.
TIMES , Apr. 3, 2002, at 12.
4. Howard Davies, Foreword — The Importance of Getting Supervision
Right, in COURTIS, supra note 2, at xi.
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of the policy objectives of the European Union (“EU”) in the establishment of a fully integrated financial market. The convergence of national regulatory structures of member states has
been identified as a necessary step for the achievement of that
good.5
Scandinavian countries led the way in establishing unitary
financial regulators.6 Norway was the first country to establish
an integrated regulatory agency in 1986, followed by Denmark
in 1988, and Sweden in 1991.7 However, as the first major international financial center to adopt the single regulator
model,8 changes made in the U.K. have attracted particular international attention. For countries that are major financial
centers,9 an important argument in favor of the single regulator
model is that it matches the nature of their markets — in that
the emergence of financial “supermarkets” and increased use of
sophisticated techniques, such as securitization and derivatives
trading, have broken down the traditional sectoral distinctions.10 The trend towards the blurring of sectoral boundaries
intensified during the 1990s.11 The overhaul of the U.K.’s regulatory structure thus largely coincided with a period in which
5. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE M EN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
WISE M EN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN S ECURITIES M ARKETS 42 (2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/
lamfalussyen.pdf.
6. Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia, Financial Market Regulation
and Supervision: How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. INT ’L L.
463, 469–78 (2002) (providing a general survey of European regulatory frameworks).
7. M ICHAEL T AYLOR & ALEX FLEMING, INTEGRATED FINANCIAL S UPERVISION :
LESSONS FROM NORTHERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 4–7 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 2223, 1999), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/950_wps
2223.pdf. Banking supervision has never been a central bank function in
these countries so the Scandinavian experience has little guidance to offer on
this aspect of regulatory consolidation.
8. CLIVE BRIAULT , THE RATIONALE FOR A S INGLE N ATIONAL FINANCIAL
S ERVICES REGULATOR 5 (FSA, Occasional Paper 2, 1999), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/index-1999.html [hereinafter BRIAULT,
THE RATIONALE ].
9. This argument may be less significant for countries with smaller or
less mature markets. See RICHARD K. ABRAMS & M ICHAEL W. TAYLOR , ISSUES
IN THE UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL S ECTOR S UPERVISION 10–14 (International
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/213, 2000), available at
http://www.imt.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00213.pdf.
10. BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 12–17.
11. Id. at 12–14.
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the need for changes to national regulatory arrangements, in
order to keep pace with the markets, was an issue for public
policy debate in many countries.12
In addition to trends in the international financial markets,
changes to national financial regulatory structures are also
driven by country-specific factors.13 This was certainly true in
the U.K., where some of the impetus for change came from local
financial scandals and collapses that were attributed, in part, to
failings in the old system.14 Throughout the world, there is
wide variety in the existing institutional arrangements and,
despite the current interest in the single regulator model, its
adoption in practice remains relatively rare.15 The powerful
influence exerted by national historical roots and social, economic, and political traditions16 means that this situation seems
likely to persist. To take the obvious example of the United
States, adoption of the single regulator model would face practical and political hurdles that currently appear insurmountable.17 The recognition that national institutional arrangements evolve under the influence of local factors, as well as
global trends in financial markets, suggests that there is no one
ideal institutional model that is universally applicable.
While this Article makes no claim as to the superiority of the
single regulator model, it considers what other countries may
learn from the U.K.’s experience in adopting that structure. A
key feature is the extent of fundamental legal change that
accompanied the U.K.’s shift to the single regulator model.
Unlike some other countries, such as Korea which has a single
regulatory agency but separate sectorally-divided legal regimes,18 the U.K. has sought to match the unitary nature of its
12. CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: W HY , HOW AND
WHERE NOW? 181 (1998).
13. Id.
14. BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 8.
15. ABRAMS & TAYLOR , supra note 9, at 3. But others see “clear signs” of a
trend towards unified supervision, particularly for larger financial markets.
See, e.g., COURTIS, supra note 2, at xiii.
16. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 145.
17. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, the creation
of a single regulator would be “highly undesirable on both political and economic grounds.” ROSA M ARIE LASTRA , CENTRAL BANKING AND B ANKING
REGULATION 147 (1996).
18. See generally Joon Soo Lee, Integrated Financial Supervision: The Korean Experience (Asian Development Bank Project, 2002) available at
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institutional arrangements for financial regulation with an integrated legal framework. This ambitious approach means that
the U.K. should be a particularly rich source of data on using
the law to respond to the challenges involved in the process of
regulatory consolidation. Part II of this Article sets out the historical background of the transition to the single financial regulator model in the U.K. Part III examines the key events in the
transitional period between the announcement of the intended
switch and the effectuation of the new unitary regime in December 2001. Part IV looks at the main arguments — for and
against — the single regulator model; how the British legislature responded to these arguments in shaping the legislative
framework for the new regime; and at early indications of how
successfully that framework is beginning to operate in practice.
Part V offers one conclusion and some observations.
II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ADOPTION OF THE S INGLE
REGULATOR MODEL IN THE U.K.
The 1980s were a period of regulatory upheaval in the U.K.
At that time the U.K. had a fragmented regulatory structure,
with different institutional arrangements and legal regimes in
place for banking, securities, and insurance business. This historical survey examines key events in the period up to May
1997, when a new Labour government was elected in place of
the Conservative government that had been in power since
1979.
In the days immediately following the 1997 election, the new
Labour government moved with remarkable swiftness to start
the process of switching to the single regulator model. This was
one of the new government’s first major policy initiatives.19
This begs the que stion: What had happened to put regulatory
reform so high on the new government’s list of priorities?

www.adb/org/projects/APEC/market_intermediaries/integrated_financial_supe
rvision_kor.pdf.
19. Eva Lomnicka, Reforming U.K. Financial Services Regulation: The
Creation of a Single Regulator, 1999 J. BUS . L. 480.
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A. Banking Regulation20
In the 1980s, regulatory responsibility for the U.K. banking
sector lay with the central bank — the Bank of England (“the
Bank”). Although the Bank’s informal involvement in the supervision of banks dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, it
was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers to grant or refuse authorization to carry on a banking business in the U.K.21
Catalysts for the changes made by the Banking Act 1979 were
the secondary banking crisis of 1973–1974 and the Banking Coordination Directive of 1977, which was the first major step towards European harmonization in the banking sector.22
Banking failures continued to influence change throughout
the following years. In 1984, the collapse of Johnson Matthey
Bankers Ltd. exposed defects in the framework established by
the Banking Act 1979.23 As a consequence, that structure was
replaced by a new legislative framework.24 The Banking Act
1987 confirmed the Bank in its role as bank regulator and
strengthened its supervisory powers.25 The 1987 Act introduced
a new “Board of Banking Supervision” to assist the Bank in its
supervisory functions.26
In 1991 another bank failure —the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”) — again put the U.K. banking
regulatory framework under scrutiny.27 Although international
supervisory action coordinated by the Bank had brought about
BCCI’s closure in 1991, the Bank was heavily criticized for not
intervening sooner to stop BCCI’s fraudulent operations.28 An
20. This section draws upon chapter 1 of the INQUIRY INTO THE S UPERVISION
B ANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (HM Stationary Office,
1992) [hereinafter BINGHAM REPORT], which provides an excellent overview of
banking supervision in the U.K. in the period 1972–1992.
21. Banking Act, 1979 (Eng.) (repealed 1987).
22. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 1.15.
23. Id. ¶ 1.38.
24. Banking Act, 1987 (Eng.) (repealed 2001).
25. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 1.47.
26. Id.
27. See generally Ray P. Kinsella, Some Regulatory and Supervisory Lessons of the BCCI Collapse, in INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE , RESEARCH
PAPER NO . 92/10, RESEARCH PAPERS IN BANKING AND FINANCE (1992); PETER
TRUELL & LARRY G URWIN, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE S TORY OF BCCI, THE
WORLD ’S M OST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1992).
28. See generally Kinsella, supra note 27.
OF THE
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official inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Bingham, was convened. The inquiry found weaknesses in the Bank’s approach
to coping with sophisticated fraud. Specifically, it was found
that the Bank relied too heavily on informal methods based on
trust and frankness.29 It also identified gaps in the Bank’s powers. In response, certain technical changes were made to the
Banking Act 1987, as well as changes to the Bank’s supervisory
practices.30 On the more radical question — whether a reorganization of regulatory responsibility was required — the inquiry produced a negative response.31 The option of transferring banking regulatory responsibility from the central bank to
an independent body was specifically rejected.32 The inquiry
found nothing in the history of BCCI to invalidate the judgment, made prior to the Banking Act 1987, to continue to entrust this task to the Bank.33
The spectacular collapse of Barings in 1995 prompted another
official inquiry in the U.K., this time by the Board of Banking
Supervision.34 The Barings crisis had been triggered by massive unauthorized losses incurred by a single derivatives trader
employed by the Singaporean arm of the Barings group.35 The
official inquiry found that the main reasons for the collapse of
Barings were management failings within Barings and lack of
appropriate internal controls.36 In addition, it also found some
failings in the Bank’s performance as the lead supervisor of the
29. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 3.8.
30. M AXIMILIAN J.B. H ALL , H ANDBOOK OF B ANKING REGULATION AND
S UPERVISION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 133–34 (3d ed. 1999).
31. BINGHAM REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 3.3.
32. Id. ¶¶ 3.4–3.5.
33. Id. ¶¶ 3.4–3.5. This issue had been carefully discussed in the WHITE
PAPER ON BANKING S UPERVISION, 1985, Cmnd. 9695, which had preceded the
Banking Act 1987. Brian Quinn, The Influence of the Banking Acts (1979 and
1987) on the Bank of England’s Traditional Style of Banking Supervision, in
BANK REGULATION AND S UPERVISION IN THE 1990S, at 1 (Joseph J. Norton ed.,
1991).
34. See REPORT OF THE BOARD OF B ANKING S UPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF B ARINGS (HM Stationary Office, 1995)
[hereinafter COLLAPSE OF BARINGS REPORT].
35. NICK LEESON & EDWARD W HITLEY, ROGUE TRADER: HOW I B ROUGHT
DOWN BARINGS BANK AND S HOOK THE FINANCIAL WORLD (1996); LUKE HUNT &
KAREN HEINRICH, BARINGS LOST : NICK LEESON AND THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS
PLC (1996).
36. COLLAPSE OF BARINGS REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶ 13.10–13.12.
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Barings group.37 Like the previous BCCI collapse, Barings provided a graphic illustration of the difficult challenges facing national regulators attempting to supervise complex multinational
banking groups. It also illustrated the need within a fragmented regulatory system for close contact and cooperation between banking and securities regulators in order to achieve effective supervision of financial supermarkets, whose businesses
straddled the fuzzy boundaries between those sectors.38
While bank failures were reflecting badly on the Bank in its
regulatory role, a growing consensus was emerging among politicians and economists in favor of giving the central bank monetary policy independence.39 Central bank independence is regarded as a practical consequence of the new economic orthodoxy in which monetary policy is the main instrument for delivering price stability.40
The connection between monetary policy independence and
the location of regulatory responsibility for the banking sector is
that if the two functions are combined, regulatory concerns may
create conflicts of interest that undermine policy independence.
37. Id. ¶¶ 13.57–13.61.
38. Id. ¶ 14.44. The earlier collapse of a smaller bank (British & Commonwealth) in 1990 had also demonstrated the need for close cooperation
between relevant regulatory bodies. In the light of subsequent events, Hall’s
comment on the British & Commonwealth situation was particularly percipient. Hall stated: “one can but wonder if institutional rather than functional
regulation would be a better way of dealing with the myriad public interest
considerations which arise in connection with the regulation and supervision
of highly diversified financial conglomerates.” HALL, supra note 30, at 189
n.134.
39. See generally L ASTRA, supra note 17, at 10–62. The issue of central
bank independence is also partly tied up with the euro-entry debate and entry
conditions because Article 108 of the Treaty of Amsterdam requires the member state central banks which, along with the European Central Bank
(“ECB”), form the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) to be independent with regard to Treaty obligations. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING
THE T REATY ON THE E UROPEAN U NION , THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED A CTS, Nov.10, 1997, art. 108,
O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
40. LASTRA , supra note 17, at 13–18; Michael Taylor, Central Bank Independence: The Policy Background, in BLACKSTONE ’S GUIDE TO THE B ANK OF
ENGLAND ACT 1998, at 19–20 (Michael Blair et al. eds., 1998); Hossein Samiei
& Jan Kees Martijn, Operational Independence and the Conduct of Monetary
Policy in the United Kingdom, in H OSSEIN S AMIEI ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL
M ONETARY FUND: UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE (IMF Staff Country Report
No. 99/44, 1999).
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Following Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker,41 Michael
Taylor hypothesizes that a central bank might not want to adjust interest rates if to do so might trigger a number of bank
failures for which it could be blamed. Separating the monetary
policy and regulatory roles would remove this conflict and leave
the central bank to determine monetary policy free from extraneous influe nces. But the arguments for and against separation of functions are finely balanced.42 This view is not, ho wever, universal. Arguments against separation include: the role
of the central bank as lender of last resort; its oversight function in relation to the payment system; the need for consistency
between monetary policy and banking supervision; and synergistic advantages in concentration of functions.43 This debate
indicates that a central bank will inevitably have continuing
involvement in some aspects of the regulatory process because
of its role in ensuring financial stability and, further, that the
demarcation of its responsibilities and those of any other body
that assumes a banking supervisory role is an issue that must
be specifically addressed.
Practical events and the evolution of the public policy economic agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s thus provided various reasons for considering change in banking regulation. It
should also be noted that U.K. banking law and regulation was
significantly amended during this period in order to implement
various new European Community (“EC”) measures.44 These
changes — though very significant in their own right in that
they removed internal barriers to the free operation of banking
activities throughout the EU — did not have a major direct impact on the institutional framework of regulation and so they,
and equivalent measures in securities and insurance law, do
not require detailed examination here.45 Their immediate relevance to the present discussion is that piecemeal changes to
41. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation
Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, in CHARLES A.E. GOODHART , THE
EMERGING FRAMEWORK OF FINANCI AL REGULATION 133, 141 (1998).
42. Taylor, supra note 40, at 20.
43. LASTRA , supra note 17, at 148–49.
44. See H ALL , supra note 30, at 36.
45. See generally id. (providing an in-depth view of the evolution of supervisory practice and the structure of banking supervision in the U.K.);
CHRISTOS H ADJIEMMANUIL , BANKING REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND
(1996).
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existing legislation and the addition of extra layers of regulation, such as those that took place in the 1980s and 1990s to
implement EU measures, added to the complexity of the
framework and to compliance costs. An advantage of a fundamental root-and-branch reform was that it would provide an
opportunity for a thorough, principled assessment of how best
to combine domestic and EU requirements into a coherent overall framework.46
B. Securities Regulation47
The history of the U.K. securities regulation in the 1980s and
early 1990s paralleled that of banking regulation; it is the story
of a system that was undermined by financial scandals that
badly affected consumer confidence. It was also a complex system that exacerbated the problems involved in ensuring effective supervision of multi-function firms. The excessively fragmented regulatory infrastructure of the securities industry
meant that firms were often regulated by more than one regulatory agency, with the consequence that the system was heavily
dependent upon the quality and effectiveness of communications and cooperation between the regulators. To be sure, there
was strong industry dissatisfaction with the system, because
the presence of multiple regulators created an uncertainty as to
boundaries and created inefficiencies.48 From its inception, the
regulatory regime was the target of persistent criticism. It was
seen to be unwieldy and bureaucratic. The extremely detailed,
legalistic style of early versions of regulatory rulebooks did little
to enhance the reputation of those responsible for the regime.49
When even the head regulator acknowledged in 1993 that many
46. Alistair Darling, The Regulation of the U.K. Insurance Industry, 4 INT’ L
INS . L. REV . 171, 173 (1996).
47. This section draws upon FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL (House
of Commons Library Research Paper 99/68) June 24, 1999, available at
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-068.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL].
48. Amelia C. Fawcett, Examining the Objectives of Financial Regulation
— Will the New Regime Succeed? A Practitioner’s View, in REGULATING
FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 37, 47 (Eilís
Ferran & Charles A. E. Goodhart eds., 2001) [hereinafter REGULATING IN THE
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY].
49. BEN PETTET, COMPANY L AW 340 (2001); Andrew M. Whittaker, Legal
Technique in City Regulation, 43 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS . 35, 42 (1990).
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of the criticisms were justified,50 it became indisputable that the
U.K.’s defective securities regulation system was in dire need of
reform.
The source of the problems was the institutional structure e stablished under the Financial Services Act 1986. Under the
Act, ultimate regulatory responsibility for the financial services
industry lay with a government department. However, most
regulatory powers were delegated to the Securities and Investments Board (“SIB”), a private company limited by guarantee
and financed by a levy on market participants.51 The SIB set
the overall framework of regulation but did not itself act as the
direct regulator of most investment firms. Second tier regulators — of whom the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) were
the most prominent group — performed that function.52 SROs
were funded, and partly managed, by investment firms. For
this reason the style of regulation established by the Financial
Services Act 1986, was sometimes described as “self-regulation
within a statutory framework.”53 Underlying the emphasis on
self-regulation in this description was a political compromise
designed to assuage the concerns of market participants. As
was noted by Professor Gower, whose studies of U.K. securities
regulation in the 1980s powerfully influenced the character of
the regime, the intellectually appealing full statutory model
could not be pursued at that time because it would have been
unacceptable in light of prevailing market conditions.54 The
extent to which the system established under the Financial
Services Act 1986 truly retained a self-regulatory character in
practice is debatable.55 That it was presented in this way ho wever, soon had unfortunate repercussions. Many observers
50. ANDREW L ARGE , FINANCIAL S ERVICES REGULATION : M AKING THE TW O
TIER S YSTEM WORK 10 (1993).
51. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 61 (Eng.).
52. LARGE , supra note 50, at 22, 45.
53. GUIDE TO FINANCIAL S ERVICES REGULATION 27 (Barry A. K. Rider et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1997); ALAN C. PAGE & ROBERT B. FERGUSON, INVESTOR
PROTECTION 78–105 (1992).
54. LAURENCE CECIL BARTLETT GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR P ROTECTION : A
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 75–83 (1982).
55. Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, “Big Bang” and City Regulation, 51
M OD. L. REV . 1 (1988); Iain MacNeil, The Future for Financial Regulation: The
Financial Services and Markets Bill, 62 M OD. L. REV . 725 (1999); Eilís Ferran,
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the U.K. Financial Sector, 21 CIV . JUST. Q.
135, 137 (2002).
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latched onto the self-regulatory dimension as a key reason why
the regime failed to succeed.56 Yet, while growing mistrust of
self-regulation undoubtedly played a part in the events that
unfolded over the following years,57 the more potent seeds of the
regime’s destruction lay in the complex two-tier structure and
in the fragmentation at the SRO level.
At the outset, there were five SROs; however, by 1994, only
three remained — the Securities and Futures Authority
(“SFA”), the Investment Managers’ Regulatory Organisation
(“IMRO”), and the Personal Investment Authority (“PIA”).58
Some of the changes to the institutional arrangements at the
SRO level can be seen in a positive light, as being the dynamic
response of a flexible and market-sensitive system to developments in the industry.59 But it is also the case that much of the
change was driven by dissatisfaction about overlaps and possible gaps in the areas of responsibilities of the original SROs.60
There were persistent concerns about the effectiveness of the
SROs’ efforts to prevent fraud and misconduct. The SROs attracted severe criticism for having failed to protect the interests
of consumers in a number of high-profile financial scandals.
These included the Maxwell affair, where the IMRO’s failure to
detect the theft of company pension fund assets by its controller, Robert Maxwell, was the target of particular complaint.61
Another notorious problem that damaged the reputation of the
regulatory agencies in the early 1990s was that of pension misselling, whereby investors were sold inappropriate pension investment products.62 Julia Black and Richard Nobles describe
the pensions mis-selling episode as a manifestation of “a critical
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

GOWER, supra note 54 at 13–16.
Alistair Alcock, A Regulatory Monster, 1998 J. BUS . L. 371, 375.
Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 10(2) (Eng.).
4 Fin. Serv. Rep. (Sweet & Maxwell) ¶ 2-650 (Aug. 2000).
Id.
2 S IR ROGER THOMAS ET AL ., M IRROR G ROUP NEWSPAPERS PLC .
INVESTIGATIONS UNDER S ECTION 432 (2) AND 442 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985
app. 9 (2001), provides a review of IMRO’s work in relation to Maxwell group
companies and of changes made at IMRO after the eventual discovery of
Maxwell’s fraudulent schemes. On the other hand, PETTET, supra note 49, at
341, presents a more positive assessment of the effectiveness of SRO disciplinary measures and the hard-hitting nature of their operations.
62. Gerard McMeel, The Consumer Dimension of Financial Services Law:
Lessons from the Pensions Mis-selling Scandal, 3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY
L. REV . 29, 29 (1999).
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failing in the regulatory structure” involving “regulatory blindness,” “lack of awareness,” and “lack of communication and cooperation between the different regulators.”63
In a personal assessment published after the Maxwell affair,
the then Chairman of the SIB, Andrew Large, identified a number of problems that were thought to afflict the regime he
headed: lack of clarity about regulatory objectives; lack of confidence that self-regulation was anything other than self-interest;
doubts about cost-effectiveness; and a feeling that fraud was
going undetected.64 Chairman Large’s acknowledgement that
many of these criticisms were justified set the agenda for policy
discussions and political debate in the following years.65 By the
end of 1995, it was a clearly articulated Labour Party policy,
then in opposition, to remove the last remnants of selfregulation and the “unnecessary” distinction between the SIB
and the SROs.66 It seems likely that a Conservative government would have traveled the same route had it remained in
power. However, there was no indication at this stage of quite
how radical the incoming Labour government would be. The
case for a single regulator for the whole of the financial sector
did not yet figure prominently in the discussions.
C. Insurance67
The regulation of the insurance industry in the 1980s and
1990s was a complex affair, yet it attracted little attention from
policymakers (except in relation to the Lloyd’s insurance market where there were particular problems). The prudential
regulation and authorization of insurance companies were the
responsibility of a government department under the Insurance

63. Julia Black & Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The
Causes and Lessons of Regulatory Failure, 61 M OD. L. REV . 789, 789, 815
(1998).
64. LARGE , supra note 50, at 8.
65. See, e.g., T REASURY AND CIVIL S ERVICE COMMITTEE, THE S IXTH REPORT ,
1995, cmt. 332, at vi.
66. See FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL, supra note 47, at 17
(speech by Alistair Darling, the then Labour spokesman on the City). See also
Darling, supra note 46, at 172.
67. See generally JOHN BIRDS & NORMA J. HIRD, BIRDS, M ODERN INSURANCE
LAW ch. 2 (5th ed. 2001); JOHN P. LOWRY & P HILIP R AWLINGS, INSURANCE L AW:
DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES 348–66 (1999); Darling, supra note 46.
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Companies Act 1982.68 Long term insurance policies were
treated as investments for the purposes of the Financial Services Act 1986 with the result that these aspects of insurance
companies’ business also fell within the scope of the regulatory
regime established under that Act.69 Insurance brokers were
also subject to another form of self-regulation within a statutory
framework70 operated by a body known as the Insurance Brokers Registration Council. By the 1990s, the continuance of
this degree of self-regulation was regarded as anomalous.71 The
Lloyd’s insurance market had a special status under the Insurance Companies Act 198272 and an exemption under the Financial Services Act 1986.73 Problems at Lloyd’s in the early 1990s
resulting from disastrous losses put its special regulatory status
under scrutiny. Some observers suggested that by not being
within the scope of the Financial Services Act 1986, Lloyd’s lost
out on access to the latest standards and methods of regulation
and that, if it had been better regulated, the impact of the
losses might have been less severe.74 An internal review published in early 1997 recommended that Lloyd’s should be
68. Insurance Companies Act, 1982 c. 50, § 3 (Eng.). See also Richard
Croly, The Regulatory Structure in the United Kingdom: The Role of the Department of Trade and Industry, 1 INT’ L INS . L. REV 349 (1993). Responsibility
for regulation of the insurance industry was assumed by another government
department, HM Treasury, in 1997 as a prelude to its transfer to the Financial Services Authority. Press Release, HM Treasury, Working Towards a
Single Financial Regulator (July 30, 1998) available at www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/1998/press_127_98.cfm.
69. See generally G UIDE TO FINANCIAL S ERVICES REGULATION 370–86 (Barry
A. K. Rider et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997).
70. Insurance Brokers Registration Act, 1977, c. 46 (Eng.) (repealed 2001).
71. ANDREW M CGEE , T HE M ODERN LAW OF INSURANCE 21 (2001); Richard
Spiller, Insurance: Broker Regulation, 6 INT’L INS . L. REV N-67, at N-67 to N68 (1998).
72. Insurance Companies Act, 1982, c. 50, § 2(2)(a) (Eng.).
73. Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, Pt. I, c. IV, § 42 (Eng.).
74. David Gittings, Lloyd’s of London: The Regulation of an International
Insurance Market, 1 J. INT ’L FI N. M ARKETS 72, 74–75 (1999); Darling, supra
note 46, at 172. The U.K. government’s oversight of the Lloyd’s insurance
market during the 1980s is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the
European Commission. However, the investigation focuses more on whether
the system of regulation has been improved by the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000, than on holding the U.K. to account for past mistakes.
Andrew Osborn, Court Hopes Dented for Lloyd’s Names, G UARDIAN (London),
Oct. 8, 2002, at 24.
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brought within the regulatory jurisdiction of the SIB.75 The
proposal was soon swept up into the radical new approach to
financial regulation announced by the new Labour government
in May 1997.
D. All Change
The new Labour government was elected on May 1, 1997. On
May 6, 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown,
announced that he was giving monetary policy ind ependence to
the Bank.76 This was followed on May 20 by a further announcement from the Chancellor, in which he announced the
transfer of responsibility for banking regulation and supervision from the Bank of England to the SIB, as well as reform of
the regulatory structure introduced by the Financial Services
Act 1986. According to the Chancellor: “SIB will become the
single regulator underpinned by statute. The current system of
self-regulation will be replaced by a new and fully statutory system, which will put the public interest first, and increase public
confidence in the system.” 77 The instigation of regulatory reform in itself was no surprise, but that it took the form of a
switch to a single regulator was unexpected and politically contentious,78 not least because the Governor of the Bank had not
been consulted about the proposals to strip the Bank of its regulatory role.79 Previous statements from Labour Party spokesmen had suggested more modest, incremental change concen-

75. See Gittings, supra note 74, at 75.
76. Gordon Brown, Statement by the Chancellor on the Central Economic
Objectives of the New Government (May 6, 1997), at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/speeches/statement/speech_
statement_index.cfm? The background to this announcement and its consequences are discussed generally in the House of Lords Select Committee Report, M ONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND REPORT, 1999,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/
ldmon/96/9601.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
77. Gordon Brown, The Chancellor’s Statement to the House of Commons
on the Bank of England (May 20, 1997), at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
Newsroom_and_Speeches/speeches/statement/speech_
statement_index.cfm? [hereinafter Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of
England].
78. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL, supra note 47, at 20–25.
79. On the political fallout of the decision, see ANDREW RAWNSLEY,
S ERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE : THE INSIDE S TORY OF NEW LABOUR 41–44 (2000).
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trating, in particular, on dismantling the two-tier structure under the Financial Services Act 1986.80
According to the Chancellor’s statement, there were three key
reasons for the new approach: (1) The existing system was failing to deliver the standards of investor protection and supervision that the industry and the public had the right to expect; (2)
The two tier structure under the Financial Services Act 1986
was inefficient, confusing, and lacked accountability and a clear
allocation of responsibilities; and (3) The need for a regulatory
structure that would reflect the nature of the markets where
the old distinctions between banks, securities firms, and insurance companies had become increasingly blurred.81 The first
two reasons were predictable, given the local historical record.
The third reason had not previously enjoyed the same degree of
prominence. Although matching the nature of the national
regulator to the nature of the markets is now the familiar centerpiece of discussions about the institutional framework of
regulation, in the political debates on financial regulation in the
U.K. in the 1990s it was not an issue that had attracted particular attention.
So why was the single market/single regulator argument
raised to such a prominent position by the British Chancellor?
The full answer to this question may well remain unknown until current political figures publish their memoirs or until confidential political records are finally released. Mark Boléat, who
was the then Director-General of the Association of British Insurers, however, has put forward one plausible theory. Boléat
suggests that the decision to opt for a single regulator was
driven more by pragmatic considerations relating to pressures
on the parliamentary timetable than by principle:
The Treasury team had failed to secure in the first Queen’s
Speech legislation to abolish the two tier system under the Financial Services and Markets Act. However, a separate dec ision had been taken to give the Bank of England independence
in respect of conducting monetary policy and this did require
legislation. It seems that an opportunist decision was taken at
this stage to move towards a single regulator because the legislation to give the Bank of England independence in respect

80. Darling, supra note 46, at 172.
81. Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of England, supra note 77.
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of monetary policy could be used for any other purpose relevant to the Bank of England. 82

Initial proposals were very sketchy and important industry sectors, including, for a brief time, insurance,83 and, for a much
longer time, mortgage lending,84 were not part of the remit
originally envisaged for the new regulator.85 This credits the
theory that the switch to a single regulator was a policy decision made “on the hoof” in response to political pressures unconnected to the evolving nature of financial markets.86 Another theory that has also been suggested is that personal
antagonism between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
Governor of the Bank also played a part in driving the decision
to divest the Governor of his institution’s regulatory powers.87
For observers trying to discover what lessons can be learned
from the U.K. experience in adopting the single regulator
model, the clearest point that eme rges from this brief historical
survey up to 1997 is confirmation of the influence of intensely
local, country-specific factors in decisions about institutional
structures. But May 1997 is too soon to leave the story. Although the decision itself may have been taken opportunisti82. Mark Boléat, The New System of Financial Regulation, Speech at the
London Insurance Institute (Nov. 25, 1998).
83. The inclusion of insurance in the new structure was announced in July
1997. Press Release, Department of Trade and Industry, Future Regulation of
the Insurance Industry (July 23, 1997), available at http://www.newsreleasearchive.net/coi/depts/GTI/coi1035d.ok.
84. JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS , DRAFT
FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL: FIRST REPORT ¶ 84 (HL Paper 50-I,
HC 328-I, 1999) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT], recommended
that mortgages should be brought within the scope of the new regime. In
response, HM Treasury conducted a consultation exercise with the publication
of HM TREASURY, REGULATION OF M ORTGAGES: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT BY HM
TREASURY (July 20, 1999). Following this consultation exercise, the decision
was made to include mortgages, and power to extend the regime in this way
was included in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. However, so as
not to over burden the FSA in its early days, its assumption of powers in relation to mortgage business was postponed. The FSA currently expects to begin
regulating mortgage lenders and advisers by mid-2004. FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AUTHORITY, TIMETABLE FOR THE REGULATION OF M ORTGAGES AND GENERAL
INSURANCE (2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/mort_gen_ins/mgi_
timetable.pdf.
85. See also Alcock, supra note 57, at 372, 375.
86. Id.
87. RAWNSLEY, supra note 79, at 41–44.
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cally without full consideration of all of its implications, its announcement was a highly significant event. It intensified debate amongst theorists, inside and outside the U.K., about different institutional structures for financial regulation.88 At the
same time, the challenges involved in turning the single regulator model into practical reality soon became a major preoccup ation for industry participants.
III. PUTTING POLICY INTO EFFECT — CREATING A NATIONAL
SINGLE R EGULATOR 89
The first stage in the reform process was the renaming of the
SIB as the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in October
1997. 90 Thereafter, most of the existing regulatory agencies collapsed themselves into the FSA structure on a largely informal
and ad hoc basis.91 In effect, the FSA assumed the de facto role
of single regulator.92 But for a transitional period ending on
December 1, 2001, the FSA’s powers were mostly derived from
the old legislation under which the previous fragmented regimes had operated.93 One important exception was in the banking field, where regulatory and supervisory responsibilities
were formally passed to the FSA in June 1998 under the Bank
of England Act 1998.94 However, the 1998 Act merely transferred existing powers without significant amendment. The
FSA, as the renamed SIB, was, and still remains, in form, a
company limited by guarantee.95

88. For a general survey see G OODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 142–88.
89 Lomnicka, supra note 19.
90. See FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT (1997),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp01.pdf, for a summary of enabling legislation and background.
91. Howard Davies, Law and Regulation, 3 J. INT ’L FI N. M ARKETS 169, 169
(2001) [hereinafter Davies, Law and Regulation].
92. Formally, the FSA acted as the sub-delegate of existing regulatory
agencies. See FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT app. I
(1997), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp01.pdf.
93. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORIT Y, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/history (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003).
94. Bank of England Act, 1998, § 3, sched. 4 (Eng.). See also Davies, Law
and Regulation, supra note 91, at 170; Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain
and the United States, 20 M ICH . J. INT’L L. 595, 646 (1999).
95. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 13–14, 17 (Eng.).
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The process of vesting full powers in the FSA as single regulator began in July 1998 with the publication of the Financial
Services and Markets Bill in draft form.96 A period of consultation with industry participants, consumer groups, and other
interested parties followed. The most significant part of the
public consultation process was the establishment in Fe bruary
1999 of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to scrutinize the draft Bill — the first time a Joint Committee had
been charged with this task.97 The Joint Committee, under the
Chairmanship of Lord Burns, a former chief civil servant at HM
Treasury (“Treasury”), opened paper submission on certain major issues arising from the draft Bill.98 In addition, the Joint
Committee held sessions of oral evidence. The witnesses at
these sessions included representatives from the government,
the FSA, investment and commercial banks, insurers, consumer
groups, and law firms.99 A novel feature of the oral evidence
sessions was that they were run as discussions with fellow panelists allowed to respond to each other's comments and sugge stions rather than just responding to questions from members of
the Joint Committee. To facilitate discussion, the head of the
Treasury Bill team and the Deputy General Counsel of the FSA
attended all of the sessions.100 The Joint Committee’s method of
conducting its consultation process and the two reports which it
produced at the end of its deliberations attracted widespread
praise.101 The Joint Committee was thought to have clarified a
number of key issues, in particular the impact of the European
Convention on Human Rights on the disciplinary and enforcement procedures of the new regime.102 This issue was highly
96. Press Release, FSA, Publication of the Draft Bill (July 30, 1998).
97. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84.
98. Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Press Notice No.
2 of Session 1998–99 (Mar. 10, 1999).
99. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 6, Minutes of Evidence.
100. Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Press Notice No.
3 of Session 1998–99 (Mar. 19, 1999); JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra
note 84, ¶ 6.
101. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84. See also JOINT
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS, D RAFT FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AND M ARKETS B ILL, P ARTS V , V I AND XII IN RELATION TO THE E UROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, S ECOND REPORT (1999).
102. Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 170.

File: FERRAN Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 4/2/2003 1:23 PM

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:29 AM

U.K.’S SINGLE FINANCIAL REGULATOR

275

topical because the Human Rights Act 1998 was about to bring
the Convention more fully into effect under British law. 103
Although it achieved some notable successes, the Joint Committee sat only for a couple of months and, in the limited time
period available, it was able to deal only with selected aspects of
the new legislation.104 The debate then moved into the main
chambers of both Houses of Parliament. After a laborious and
sometimes controversial passage through Parliament,105 the Bill
finally received Royal Assent in June 2000.106 However the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) provides only
the framework of the new regime. The elaborate and extensive
details of the regime are contained in secondary legislation,
statutory instruments made by the Treasury, and in rules made
by the FSA.107 The process of filling in the details occupied the
period from Royal Assent until December 1, 2001 (a date known
as “N2”), when the new regime finally came into effect.108
Thus, although the FSA has been de facto operational in some
form since 1997, it has enjoyed its full powers for only a relatively brief period. This creates an unusual situation. On the
one hand, the FSA has had time to establish itself and to begin
to build its own identity and methods of operation. Industry,
consumers, and the media have had time to experience the reality of dealing with the FSA as a quasi-single regulator and
views have formed on how it is shaping up to the task.109 On
103. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
104. See generally Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91; JOINT
COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84.
105. According to The Sunday Telegraph: “[T]he Bill to set up the super
regulator was one of the most tortuous pieces of legislation in Parliamentary
history.” Grant Ringshaw, Crackdown in the City Slapped Wrists or Heads on
Spikes?, S UNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 25, 2001, at 5.
106. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8, Enactment Clause
(Eng.).
107. See generally HM Treasury, Financial Services, at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services (last visited Feb. 19, 2003); FSA
HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last modified Mar.
3, 2003).
108. Press Release, Financial Services Authority, FSA Consults on Proposed
Fees for New Regime (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/
2001/120.html; A Cut-Out-and-Keep Guide to the FSA, D AILY TELEGRAPH, Dec.
1, 2001, at 35.
109. Howard Davies has described the situation in these terms: “[E]ven
before it takes on its new powers, the FSA has acquired a reputation of sorts,
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the other hand, views on the performance of the FSA as a single
regulator must necessarily be qualified to take account of the
fact that it has had its full powers for only a short period of
time. The distorting effect of the process of preparing for the
new regime must also be considered. The massive task of putting in place the detailed aspects of the regime in the transitional period between 1997 and 2001 undoubtedly diverted resources and attention away from the task of practical delivery
of regulation. This means that it would clearly be premature to
attempt to say whether the FSA is really delivering in practice
the benefits claimed for a single regulator while avoiding the
problems that this structure may create. But the U.K.’s experience of living with a quasi-single regulator and, at the same
time, making the transition to a formal single regulator is still
worth examining further. A remarkable combination of processes were occurring simultaneously: The development of theoretical arguments for and against a single regulator were evolving within the context of a market that was already waking up
to the reality of living with a de facto single regulator, and all of
these influences were feeding into the political processes
through which the new regime was to acquire its legal basis and
powers.110 The U.K. experience between 1997 and 2001 thus
provides a valuable case study for testing theoretical arguments
about the merits and drawbacks of the single regulator model
and for demonstrating how those positive and negative features
can be addressed in the legal framework by which the model is
introduced.

built on its performance as a caretaker, rather than as a principal.” Davies,
Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 169.
110. See, e.g., BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 6–9; Davies, Law
and Regulation, supra note 91, at 169–70.
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IV. H OW IS THE NEW R EGIME SHAPING UP? USING THE U.K.
EXPERIENCE TO T EST AND EXAMINE THE L EGISLATIVE AND
PRACTICAL RESPONSES TO THEORETICAL CONCERNS
A. A Single Financial Regulator is Superior because it Mirrors
the Nature of the Participants and Products in Financial Markets
This is a prominent argument in favor of the single regulator
model.111 The proposition that a single regulator is advantageous be cause it mirrors the nature of modern financial markets, where old distinctions between different sectors and different products have broken down, certainly has logical superficial attraction. However, some commentators have cautioned
that the trend towar ds industry consolidation should not be exaggerated.112 Although some firms are genuine financial supermarkets with major areas of activity in more than one of the
main sectors of banking, securities, and insurance, many others
remain dominated by their “core” business, despite some diversification into other sectors.113 For such firms, the risk that
concentration of regulatory responsibility will result in loss of
regulatory diversity and valuable sector-specific knowledge and
expertise, may not be counterbalanced in practice by a significant reduction in the number of regulatory agencies with which
they have to deal.
Was the adoption of the single regulator model interpreted by
market participants as simplification of regulation for major
financial groups operating across sectors at the expense of more
sector-specialized firms and institutions? Or was it viewed by
consumer groups as a move driven by the demands of certain
sections of the financial services industry for a system of regulation that would be mo re convenient for them rather than for
111. See Chancellor’s Statement on the Bank of England, supra note 77;
BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 12–17.
112. Alcock, supra note 57, at 376; GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153.
113. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. IL L. L. REV . 215,
254–55 (pointing out that the U.S. banking industry has separated into two
sectors: the global sector involving a small group of very large banks providing
the services of financial supermarkets; and the community sector comprising
a few thousand smaller banks that provide personalized financial services to
small businesses and moderately affluent customers).
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the needs of consumers of financial services? It appears not.
According to a progress report published by the Treasury in
March 1999, the single statutory regulator proposal had attracted almost unanimous support.114 The influential Joint
Committee on Financial Services and Markets supported the
principle of a single regulator on the basis of the written and
oral evidence presented to it.115 The proposal also attracted favorable comment from the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”).116 The comparative merits of alternative regulatory
structures that had generated some debate117 were quickly sidelined in the practical and political processes leading up to the
adoption of the single regulator model in the U.K.118
One key reason why there was no serious objection to the
principle of the single regulator may have been that it had the
great merit of simplicity. Many of the failings, real or perceived, of the predecessor regimes flowed from their inherent
complexity. The switch to a single regulator marked a decisive
and radical break with the past. Moreover, in political terms it
was clear that adoption of the single regulator was “nonnegotiable” and that the Labour government’s large majority in
Parliament would ensure the safe passage of the relevant legislation.119 Pragmatically, it made no sense for lobbying groups to
direct their efforts at challenging the basic idea of the single
regulator since that battle was already lost.120 From the con114. HM TREASURY, FINANCIAL S ERVICES AND M ARKETS BILL: P ROGRESS
REPORT ch. 2 (1999), available at http://finaserv02.uuhost.uk.uu.net/
development/legal/fsma/data/progress_report/progress_report.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 2002).
115. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 102.
116. IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with the United Kingdom, IMF
Pub. Info. Notice No. 99/17 (Mar. 7, 1999), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/pn/1999/pn9917.htm.
117. See GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 12, at 142–88; MICHAEL T AYLOR ,
CENTRE FOR THE S TUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY
S TRUCTURE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (1995) [hereinafter TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS];
M ICHAEL T AYLOR, CENTRE FOR THE S TUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, PEAK
PRACTICE : HOW TO REFORM THE U.K.’S REGULATORY S YSTEM (1996).
118. Howard Davies, Reforming Financial Regulation: Progress and Priorities, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, supra note 48, at 19 [hereinafter Davies, Reforming Financial Regulation].
119. Id.
120. Secondary battles about the scope of the regime, the powers of the single regulator, and, in particular, the accountability of a single regulator were
waiting to be fought. See infra notes 145-243 and accompanying text.
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sumer perspective, the new system offered the prospect of a
“one stop shop” for complaints and redress via a unified financial services ombudsman, and that had strong appeal.121
Does adoption of the single regulator model necessarily mean
that regulation will actually operate seamlessly unimpeded by
old sectoral boundaries? In part, this question is unanswerable
at this juncture because it involves an assessment that can only
be made with the benefit of data arising from practical experience. However, some observations arise from the processes
leading up to the formal establishment of the FSA and relating
to the arrangements as now in place.
At the policy level, the FSA has made considerable efforts to
establish its credentials as a single regulator in substance, as
well as in form, by emphasizing its new integrated approach to
regulation.122 It has adopted a single risk-based approach for
use across all regulated sectors, markets, and firms. In this
context, “risk” has an unusual interpretation.123 It used to mean
risk that the FSA will fail to achieve its statutory regulatory
objectives. The FSA’s standard risk assessment process involves scoring the risk against a number of probability and impact factors.124 The systemic nature of the firm is a relevant
factor in the assessment process because maintaining confidence in the financial system, which embraces systemic risk
concerns, is one of the statutory objectives.125 However, the
FSA has emphasized the “assessment of all risks has to be coordinated, in order to gauge the overall threat to our objectives.”126

121. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 282–96. See Ferran,
supra note 55, on the implementation of the unified ombudsman scheme and
some early assessment of its performance.
122. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, A NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW
M ILLENNIUM 29 (2000), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/p29.pdf
[hereinafter NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW M ILLENNIUM ]; FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AUTHORITY, BUILDING THE NEW REGULATOR: PROGRESS REPORT 2, ¶¶ 59–63
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/bnr_progress2.pdf.
123. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multi-Sectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 332–34 (1999)
(Part II.A. discusses more common interpretations of “risk” in the context of
financial regulation).
124. NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW M ILLENNIUM , supra note 122, at 15.
125. Id. at 15, 17.
126. Id. at 15.
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The new risk-based approach to regulation is currently being
phased in,127 so it is obviously too early to gauge whether the
FSA has the organizational capacity to deliver an integrated
regulatory approach. The signs are good for those financial
conglomerates that are regulated by the FSA’s Major Financial
Groups Division, because that division has been established
specifically to “take a coherent and integrated approach to the
supervision of these groups.”128 An integrated approach is less
obvious in other parts of the FSA’s internal departmental structure, which continue to be organized along broadly sectoral
lines.129 The FSA lead regulator model — inherent in the
predecessor regimes — is employed to deal with groups that
operate predominantly in one sector but with some entities operating in other sectors.130 This structure is sensible to the extent that, under the single regulator umbrella, it allows for sensitive, differentiated regulation of businesses that are predominantly active only in one sector. In the transitional period, it
may have facilitated smooth implementation of the single regulator model because it allowed the staff employed in the previous fragmented structure to continue to work in their area of
specialization which, in turn, gave comfort to regulated firms
about continuity in practical, day-to-day relationships with

127. The fact that the FSA had not completed the rolling out of its risk
based approach was at the center of its dispute with Fitch in June 2002 in
which the FSA stated that Fitch’s report to the effect that 25% of the U.K.’s
insurers had been placed in a higher risk category was a misinterpretation of
FSA data. Jill Treanor, Regulator Calls Fitch “Plain Wrong”: FSA Denies
Insurers are “Higher Risk,” G UARDIAN (London), June 14, 2002, at 25.
128. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY , INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL
S ERVICES AUTHORITY 13 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/
fsa_intro.pdf [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE FSA]. A report commissioned
by the Centre of the Study of Financial Innovation and published in May 2001
indicated that the larger City institutions, particularly those classified as
major financial groups, expected to see the greatest benefit of the single regulator structure and that some already were. See D AVID L ASCELLES, CENTRE
FOR THE S TUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, W AKING UP TO THE FSA: HOW THE
CITY V IEWS ITS NEW REGULATOR 13 (2001) [hereinafter CSFI, WAKING UP TO
THE FSA].
129. See INTRODUCTION TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 24 (FSA Organisation Chart).
130. FINANCIAL S ERVICE S AUTHORITY , LEAD S UPERVISION : T HE FSA’S NEW
APPROACH TO THE CO-ORDINATION OF ITS S UPERVISION OF G ROUPS 5 (1999),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/p19.pdf.
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their regulators.131 But it could prove problematic in the longer
term, if it facilitates the continuation of ingrained methods and
practices that are, in principle, incompatible with the achievement of a truly integrated approach to regulation. Here, again,
there are some positive signs coming from FSA pronouncements
about insurance regulation, which emphasize that risk-based
assessment means a wholly new approach within its insurance
division.132 However, it should be noted that the FSA is under
particular pressure to signal a fresh start in insurance regulation because of recent crises in the insurance sector involving
both failing firms133 and defective products,134 for which the FSA
131. Alcock, supra note 57, at 377.
132. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY , THE F UTURE REGULATION OF
INSURANCE : A PROGRESS REPORT (Oct. 2002) at 19, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/bnr_progress3.pdf; FINANCIAL S ERVICES
AUTHORITY, T HE FUTURE REGULATION OF INSURANCE (Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/future-reg_insurance.pdf; Alex Brummer,
Spotlight Falls on Insurance, D AILY M AIL, Dec. 4, 2001, at 67 (reporting the
head of the FSA’s insurance side as taking the view that a whole new approach to insurance supervision based upon risk assessment is needed);
Robert Preston, City Watchdog Who Bites but Won’t Bark, S UNDAY TIMES
(London), Mar. 17, 2002 (reporting Howard Davies, the Chairman of the FSA,
as identifying the imperative of modernizing insurance regulation, which was
“a generation behind banking supervision and securities regulation”).
133. Equitable Life, the world’s oldest mutual life assurance company closed
to new business in December 2000 following a court case, Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Hyman, [2002] 1 A.C. 408 (H.L.), in which the House of Lords
ruled against the company in its interpretation of certain of its pension policies thereby plunging the company into extreme financial difficulties. Independent Insurance, a general insurance company, collapsed in June 2001 after
the failure of efforts to raise additional capital. These were headline-grabbing
major collapses but according to FSA data, as of January 2002, thirty-nine
general insurers were in formal insolvency proceedings in the U.K., with
quantified gross insurance liabilities of £12.5 billion. See generally Howard
Davies, “Rational Expectations” — What Should the Market, and Policyholders, Expect from Insurance Regulation?, AIRMIC Annual Lecture (Jan. 29,
2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp87.html.
134. In particular, the problem of mis-selling endowment policies, which
surfaced in the late 1990s (i.e., life assurance policies which were sold in conjunction with mortgages as a mechanism for repayment of mortgage principal
at the end of its life but without clear disclosure to customers that there was
no guarantee that the policies would in fact generate an amount sufficient to
cover the mortgage debt). According to the FSA, by 2000 an estimated 60% of
the 11 million existing mortgages were no longer on track to repay the mortgage loan. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, PROGRESS REPORT ON M ORTGAGE
ENDOWMENTS ¶ 2.18 (Oct., 2000), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
policy/p19.pdf.
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has had to shoulder some blame135 as well as attracting significant criticism from politicians and the media.136

Mis-selling allegations also surround another underperforming financial product — split capital trusts. See FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY , S PLIT
CAPITAL CLOSED END FUNDS ¶¶ 5.11, 5.15 (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp10.pdf;
FINANCIAL
S ERVICES
AUTHORITY, S PLIT CAPITAL INVESTMENT T RUSTS (SPLITS) ¶ 3.7 (May 2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/pssplits/pdf; Ingrid Mansell,
FSA Launches Investigation into Mis-selling of Splits, TIMES (London), May
18, 2002, at 43.
135. The FSA’s internal audit of the regulator’s role in regulating Equitable
Life between 1999 and 2000 identified deficiencies in FSA regulation, in particular with regard to communication between prudential and conduct of
business regulators. REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY ON THE
REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE S OCIETY FROM 1
JANUARY 1999 TO 8 DECEMBER 2000, WHICH HER M AJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IS
SUBMITTING AS EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY C ONDUCTED BY LORD PENROSE ¶ 6.2.5
(2001) [hereinafter BAIRD REPORT]; Press Release No. 57/01, Parliamentary
Ombudsman to Investigate Financial Services Authority’s Handling of Equitable Life (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://ombudsman.org.uk/pca/press/
pn57-01.htm. Following this report, the government established its own independent inquiry. See HM Treasury Press Release 113/01, Government Response to FSA Report on the Regulation of Equitable Life, (Oct. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/Press/
2001/Press_113.01.cfm. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is also investigating
the FSA’s handling of the collapse. See James Moore, Ombudsman to Investigate FSA Role at Equitable, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2001, at 24. If the Ombudsman finds the FSA guilty of maladministration, the government could be
directed to compensate policyholders.
With regard to the Independent Insurance collapse, press reports indicate that the FSA is to be sued by the company’s policyholders for its role in
the handling of the collapse. Gary Parkinson, Independent Holders Sue FSA,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 13, 2002, at 38.
136. In relation to endowment mis-selling, the FSA was criticized in the
press for not launching a full-scale review akin to that which had been conducted previously in relation to pensions mis-selling. In some quarters this
was interpreted as the FSA bowing to industry pressure rather than championing consumer interests. The FSA’s attempts to diffuse the situation by
publishing guidance to firms on dealing with endowment-related complaints
and making redress to those with legitimate claims did not stem the flow of
critical press coverage. See, e.g., David Prosser & Neasa MacErlean, Cash:
Where’s the Rest?: The Endowment Crisis Has Hit Millions Yet Regulators
Refuse a Full Review, OBSERVER, Sept. 2, 2001, at 2. Findings from a yearlong FSA review of the profits industry were also criticized by consumer
groups, with suggestions that the FSA had kowtowed to industry in its recommendations. Emma Simon, The Great With-profits Fudge: The FSA’s Report on its Investigation, S UNDAY TELEGRAPH, June 2, 2002, at 4.
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The flip-side of the argument that a single regulator will fail
in practice to deliver an integrated regulatory approach, is that
it will pursue integration over-enthusiastically thereby failing
to make appropriate differentiation between businesses that
mainly operate in different sectors, or between businesses
within the same sector but which have very different customer
bases. A single regulator is obviously vulnerable to attack on
this ground but, thus far, criticism of the FSA on the ground
that it is attempting to impose a “one -size-fits-all” approach has
been muted.137 The FSA has helped its own cause in this respect by explicitly introducing a differentiated regime, which
uses the nature of the counterparty with whom a firm deals as
the basis for determining the applicable level of conduct for
business regulation.138 This approach allows for “light touch”
regulation of business between market professionals.139 It has
been welcomed as restoring “some of the differentiation that
was inhe rent in the City’s old regime.”140
B. A Single Regulator Should Be Able to Deliver Efficiency
Gains
There are several strands to the argument that the single
regulator model may be superior to alternative regulatory
structures on efficiency grounds.141 Efficiency in this context

137. See CSFI, W AKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 4, 14–15 (reporting some fears about the growth of a mono-culture and excessive zeal for harmonization but suggesting that any loss in regulatory diversity has been offset
by greater consistency).
138. FSA HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last
modified Mar. 3, 2003); Market Conduct Sourcebook available at
www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook/legal_instruments/2001/jun21_mar.pdf (last modified Sept. 24, 2002); The Inter-Professionals Code (FSA Consultation Paper
47, 2002) available at www.fsa.gov.UK/pubs/CP/47 (last modified July 25,
2002).
139. Edward Black & Emma Radmore, CP47 — The Inter-professionals
Code, 1 FIN . S ERVICES BULL. 11 (2000).
140. CSFI, WAKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 15.
141. See generally BRIAULT, THE R ATIONALE , supra note 8, at 18–22; CLIVE
BRIAULT, REVISITING THE R ATIONALE FOR A S INGLE N ATIONAL FINANCIAL
S ERVICES REGULATOR 14–15, 27–31 (FSA Occasional Paper No. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/index-2002.html [hereinafter BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE ]; Leonardo Bartolini, The Financial
Services Authority: Structure, Mandate and Policy Issues, in HOSSEIN S AMIEI
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relates to the manner in which the regulator deploys its own
internal resources.142 This is closely linked to the efficiency of
its regulation and supervision, which relates to the wider economic impact of its activities, including compliance costs for
regulated firms.143
A single regulator’s position allows it to look across the entire
financial industry and devote regulatory resources to where
they are most needed. These include human, as well as financial, resources: the single regulator model should facilitate efficient use of available expertise and experience, a factor that
may be particularly significant where such expertise and experience are in short supply. Economies of scale and scope
should be possible because the single regulator has a unified
management structure; can take advantage of unified central
support services; introduce single databases and reporting systems; develop a single set of rules; and adopt consistent policies
that are informed by its ability to take a market or industrywide perspective.144 A single regulator should, in principle, be
able to avoid wasteful duplication and overlap. Economic literature, however, provides plenty of evidence to support
counter-arguments about the economics of scale offered by
mega-regulators.145 It is also pointed out in the literature that
the direct cost savings available by having a single institutional
infrastructure, may be “a comparatively small proportion of the
total costs of regulation.”146 With regard to the compliance cost
burden on regulated firms, in principle, firms may gain from
having to deal with only one regulator and one set of requirements. This is not guaranteed however, because a single regulator’s regime might prove to be more burdensome than the
combined weight of the applicable parts of a fragmented regime.
The FSA is funded entirely by industry levy.147 With that in
mind, it is unsurprising that the likely efficiency of the new regime was a major concern for industry participants in the peET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL M ONETARY F UND: UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE (IMF
Staff Country Report No. 99/44, 1999).
142. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 103.
143. Id.
144. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 151–52.
145. For a summary, see GOODHART ET AL ., supra note 12, at 152–55. See
also Mwenda & Fleming, supra note 1, at 3, 11.
146. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 152.
147. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 12(6) (Eng.).
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riod leading up the passing of FSMA. Politically, these were
concerns that needed to be explicitly addressed in order to retain industry confidence. Accordingly, clear provisions relating
to efficiency were built into the legislative framework.148 In discharging its general functions, the FSA must have regard to a
series of statutory regulatory principles, the first-listed of which
is “the need to use its resources in the most efficient and economic way.”149 Another of these principles is that burdens imposed must be “proportionate to the benefits . . . which are expected to result from the imposition.”150 This “proportionality
principle” provides a measure against which the FSA must
judge whether the costs of regulatory compliance that it imposes on an industry are justifiable.151 It is supplemented by
specific procedural obligations on the FSA to do, and to publish,
cost-benefit analysis as part of the process of consultation before it exercises certain of its lawmaking powers.152 The legal
obligation of the FSA to be mindful of the need to run an efficient and economic regulatory regime is further reinforced by
other statutory regulatory principles that require it to consider,
first, “the international character” of the financial industry and
the desirability of maintaining the U.K.’s competitive position
and, second, “the need to minimize the adverse effects [of its
activities] on competition.”153
The FSMA gives the government power to commission and
publish independent value for money audits of the FSA.154
However, calls for the National Audit Office to have a direct
148. Id. § 2(2)–(3).
149. Id. § 2(3)(a).
150. Id. § 2(3)(c).
151. Id. § 4(2)(a).
152. In particular, its general rulemaking powers under Financial Services
and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 155(1)(2)(a) (Eng.). Whether meaningful cost
benefit analysis can actually be achieved by the FSA is an issue that divides
commentators. Compare ISAAC ALFON & PETER A NDREWS, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION — HOW TO DO IT AND HOW IT ADDS V ALUE
(FSA Occasional Paper No. 3, 1999), with Charles A. E. Goodhart, Regulating
the Regulator — An Economist’s Perspective on Accountability and Control, in
REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 48, at 151, 156–57.
See also D AVID S IMPSON ET AL ., S OME COST BENEFIT ISSUES IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION (FSA Occasional Paper No. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/op12.pdf.
153. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2(3)(e)–(f) (Eng.).
154. Id. § 12.
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role in relation to the FSA were resisted.155 As a company, the
FSA is subject to requirements of the companies’ legislation
with regard to the publication of its annual report and accounts.156 In addition, under the FSMA it must further make
an annual report to the Treasury.157
To date, how is the FSA’s performance measuring up on efficiency and broader economic grounds? The risk-based approach
to regulation is the core of the FSA’s strategy for achieving
regulatory efficiency. The Chairman of the FSA has claimed
that: “It has already led to some significant shifts of resources
within the Authority, and to a change of emphasis in line supervisory divisions, towards pro-active work intended to head
off emerging risks, and away from routine, box-checking exercises focused on mechanical compliance with rule-based requirements.” 158
The allocation of additional resources to upgrade insurance
regulation is the most obvious shift that has taken place. This
extra allocation has been achieved by diverting resources out of
banking supervision on the basis that banking business appears
to pose far fewer risks than insur ance business.159 This approach to the allocation of resources does raise the specter of
the FSA being prone to shifting its resources around in response to short-term political pressures — insurance is certainly the obvious current weak link in the regulatory framework but it was not that long ago when banking regulation was
in the spotlight as the problem area in the aftermath of various
bank failures. However, only time will tell whether this is a
real problem.
To date, the FSA has done a reasonable job in keeping its own
costs under control. According to an FSA comparative study of
the direct costs of regulation, the U.K. ranked second most inexpensive, behind Sweden (another single regulator country),
with United States (“U.S.”) regulatory costs being some eight155. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 108–11.
156. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 10(1), 13, sched. 1
(Eng.).
157. Id. § 10.
158. Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at 172.
159. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, PLAN AND B UDGET 2002/2003, at 5
(2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/pb2002_03.pdf [hereinafter PLAN AND BUDGET 2002/03].
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een times greater than those in the U.K.160 However, there are
concerns that the FSA has only achieved this position at the
expense of regulated firms, which have faced a sharp increase
in compliance costs,161 while the brunt of increased compliance
costs have been borne disproportionately by smaller firms.162
Addressing the issue of compliance costs, FSA Chairman Howard Davies has spoken of the aim of the new regime as being to
“reduce the overall costs of regulation, especially for wellmanaged firms.”163 While an increase in compliance costs as
industry adapted to the new regime was only to be expected, in
the longer term, if the position falls far short of Davies’ aim,
this would be a major source of industry dissatisfaction. At
worst, it could result in firms engaging in “regulatory arbitrage”
and shifting their regulatory base to a lower cost jurisdiction.164
If that were to happen, the FSA would have difficulty convincing observers that it has properly observed the statutory regulatory principles on competitiveness within an international
market to which it is supposed to have regard.
Studies on whether the FSA has realized its potential in deploying human resources more efficiently may be forthcoming.
Presently, the main concern relating to the FSA’s human resources is whether it can attract, and retain in overall terms, a
sufficient number of well-qualified staff because of the large
160. Howard Davies, N2 Plus 3, Speech at the Worshipful Company of
Chartered Secretaries & Administrators Annual Lecture (Mar. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp93.html [hereinafter Davies, N2 Plus 3]. For further analysis, see FSA, ANNUAL REPORT app. 10 at
133–38 (2001/2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar01
_02.pdf; FSA, ANNUAL REPORT app. 5 at 79–83 (2000/2001), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar00_01.pdf.
161. Using the definition of compliance costs offered by ALFON & ANDREWS,
supra note 152, at 16, as being: the costs to firms and individuals of those
activities required by regulators that would not have been undertaken in the
absence of regulation. Davies notes that extensive comparative data on the
total costs of regulation is not available and that such data as exists is somewhat impressionistic. Davies, N2 Plus 3, supra note 160. See also Graham
Bannock, Financial Services Regulation: Controlling the Costs, 6 FIN. REG. 31,
32–33 (2002).
162. DAVID LASCELLES, CENTRE FOR THE S TUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS ,
HOW THE CITY V IEWS ITS NEW REGULATOR 17–19 (2001); Michael Becket, FSA
Red Tape “Hits Small Businesses,” D AILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 18, 2001,
at 34.
163. PLAN AND BUDGET 2002/03, supra note 159.
164. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 52–53.
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disparity in pay levels between the private and public sectors.165
Although the FSA has attracted some leading figures from the
professions into top-level positions,166 this is not necessarily indicative of success at all levels within its staffing structure.
Senior people who have already fulfilled many of their career
ambitions within the private sector are likely already to have
achieved a level of financial security that allows them to consider a lifestyle change and/or enables them to appreciate the
opportunity to contribute to policy development in areas with
strong public interest implications.167 Young, ambitious, and
skilled lawyers, accountants, economists, and other professionals who would be suited to careers in regulation, however, may
not (yet) have the luxury of financial security. Furthermore,
from their perspective, there is a particular disadvantage that
flows directly from the streamlined, unified structure of a single
regulator. Put simply, if the management system is unified
then there are fewer top positions to which they can aspire. On
the other hand, it may be argued that this narrowing of opportunity at the very top is counter-balanced by the greater power,
influence, and prestige that should attach to senior positions
below the very top level in an agency that is responsible for
regulating an entire industry, than to positions of an equivalent
level within a fragmented regulatory structure. The impact of
the narrowing of career opportunities that may result from the
adoption of the single regulator model, and the possible counterbalancing effect of the enhancement in the quality of certain
positions just below the very top level, are issues that, to date,
165. This was a concern for the Joint Committee. Id. ¶¶ 249–53. There
continue to be newspaper reports about the FSA’s difficulties in retaining
staff. See, e.g., Chris Hughes, FSA Aims to Stem Staff Exodus with 7.4% Pay
Rise, INDEP., Feb. 1, 2002, at 21.
166. In particular, the FSA has recruited a small team of senior executives
recently retired from banks and insurance companies (the “grey panthers”) to
keep in touch with the markets and advise the FSA staff on transactions.
Katherine Griffiths, FSA “Grey Panthers” to Hunt for Failures, INDEP., Dec.
4, 2001, at 17.
167. For example, John Tiner, now a managing director at the FSA, was
recruited from the private sector (Arthur Andersen) in 2001 with a reported
drop of £750,000 in salary. Tiner has been quoted as explaining his switch on
the grounds that it gave him the opportunity to help shape a national industry: “I’ve always known I would go into public service.” William Kay, The
Head of the FSA is a Man with a Mission to Succeed. But at What?, INDEP.,
May 25, 2002, at 2.
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have attracted little attention but they may merit closer examination.
Spending time at the FSA at an early stage in one’s career
might be attractive to young, skilled professionals if that were
to be seen as an especially good route into a lucrative career in
the private sector. Although the practice of people building careers in the financial industry in this way is not as wellestablished in the U.K. as it is assumed to be in the U.S.,168
there are growing indications of FSA experience being used as a
springboard from which to launch a more lucrative private sector career.169 Therefore, there may be an increasing trend towards this pattern of career development. Such a trend could
benefit the FSA because it could increase the size and quality of
the human resources available to it. However, there are also
potential drawbacks in that it could encourage industry capture
because junior regulators might be tempted to adopt lax practices with regard to the firms for which they are responsible in
order to enhance their own career opportunities. High turnover
of junior-level FSA staff could also prove costly for regulated
firms since they would, in effect, have to absorb costs involved
in dealing with inexperienced and untested regulators.
Generally speaking, although still a nascent organization, the
FSA regime does not show signs of having been captured by
industry. Criticisms from industry that the FSA is too consumer-orientated170 and criticisms from consumer groups that
the FSA is too pro-industry, 171 largely balance each other out,
which overall, might be thought to be a reasonable state of affairs.172 The FSA regime has broadly retained the confidence of
both industry and consumer associations. Its success in this
respect is widely attributed to the FSA’s first Chairman, How-

168. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 252.
169. See Hughes, supra note 165.
170. For example, Mary Francis, Director-General of the Association of British Insurers, has been quoted as describing the FSA as “the provisional wing
of the Consumers’ Association.” Liam Halligan, The FSA Must Put Its Own
House in Order, S UNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 29, 2001, at 4.
171. Particularly with regard to its stance on endowment mortgages and the
for profits industry more generally. See supra notes 134–37.
172. See, e.g., Chris Hughes, Three Years On, the FSA Finds Itself Under
Attack From All Sides, INDEP., July 20, 2001, at 21.
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ard Davies, who is thought to have had a benign influence on
the character of the new regime.173
C. The Single Regulator Model May Provide a More Effective
System of Regulation
Effectiveness is measured by whether a regulatory system
achieves its objectives.174 Effectiveness overlaps with suitability
— a single regulator may be more effective than alternative
regulatory models because its structure is better suited to the
increasingly integrated nature of financial markets. Employing
current popular jargon, the single regulator is likely to be effective because it has a full regulatory “toolkit” at its disposal and
is thus ideally placed to select the optimal regulatory responses
to any situation.175 Effectiveness also overlaps with efficiency
because inefficient regulation is likely to produce results that
are inimical to a properly effective system of regulation.
An argument that merits separate attention is that a single
regulator may be more effective because of the coherence and
clarity of its mandate. Lack of coherence and clarity about
what an agency is supposed to do would be a major weakness of
any regulatory system, whether it involves a single regulator or
several agencies.176 But a particular argument for the superiority of the single regulator model in this respect is that the single
regulator may be ideally positioned to maintain coherence and
clarity of purpose because its unified management structure
provides an effective mechanism for resolution of conflicts between different regulatory objectives.177 However, commentators are sharply divided on this alleged benefit. Charles Goodhart and his co-authors suggest that a single regulator may lack

173. George Trefgarne, When the FSA Pulls the Strings . . . There is a Refuge from Sir Howard Davies’s Red Tape, D AILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2001, at
35.
174. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶ 103.
175. NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW M ILLENNIUM , supra note 122, at 25–32
(Chapter 3 outlines the FSA’s regulatory tools and considers how they may be
used in practice).
176. Alan Page, Regulating the Regulator — A Lawyer’s Perspective on Accountability and Control, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra
note 48, at 127.
177. BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 7, 21.
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“a clear focus on the objectives and rationale of regulation.”178
So instead of facilitating coherence and clarity, the single regulator model may result in self-contradiction and confusion. Michael Taylor argues that, rather than being a benefit, the ability
of a single regulator to resolve disputes about objectives internally is an undesirable feature because such disputes should be
resolved at the political level due to their public policy implications.179 Alternative regulatory models have been put forward
by these authors, in which regulatory responsibilities are divided between agencies by reference to different regulatory objectives.180
Another theoretical argument for the greater effectiveness of
the single regulator model is with regard to consistency, communication, and cooperation at operational levels.181 Individual
regulators may find it easier to communicate and cooperate
with each other on matters of common concern when they all
work for the same organization rather than when they are scattered between different agencies. Moreover, they should all
have a shared cultural approach to their task and operate consistently in accordance with the common policies set at management level.182 However, success is not guaranteed. Whether
these potential gains are realized is obviously dependent on
how well separate, specialized divisions within the single regulator actually do cooperate and communicate with each other,
and how effectively a consistent cultural approach has permeated throughout the organization.183
Law can play a key role in providing a clear and authoritative
statement of objectives and in providing an agency with powers
to enable it to operate in a consistent manner. The value of establishing a legal framework specifically designed to support
the effectiveness of the single regulator model was recognized in
the U.K. The “easy” option of simply piecing together the existing sectorally-based legal regimes and vesting all of those exist178. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153. See also D ANIEL G ROS & KAREL
LANNOO , T HE EURO CAPITAL M ARKET 146–47 (1999) (arguing that regulation
by objective could result in excessive regulation of wholesale business because
of misplaced concerns about consumer protection).
179. TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS , supra note 117.
180. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 156.
181. See BRIAULT, T HE RATIONALE , supra note 8, at 17–19
182. Id.
183. GROS & LANNO O, supra note 178, at 145.
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ing powers in the FSA was ruled out in favor of the much more
ambitious approach of providing a fully integrated common legal framework.184 Thus, the FSMA gives the FSA broad powers
to regulate across the financial sector. The Act also deepens the
regulatory regime in key respects including, in particular and
most controversially, a new market abuse regime that allows
the FSA to impose civil penalties on any person — not just
those within the regulated financial industry — who has engaged in abusive conduct.185
The cornerstone of the FSMA is the statement of regulatory
objectives, which are: maintaining confidence in the financial
system; promoting public understanding of the financial system; securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and reducing financial crime.186 The FSA is under a statutory duty in discharging its general functions to act in a way
that is compatible with the regulatory objectives, but only so far
as is “reasonably possible.”187 Subject to the same qualification,
in the discharge of its general functions the FSA is also required to act in a way that it “considers most appropriate for
the purpose of meeting those objectives.”188 These duties are
supplemented by the obligation to consider specified regulatory
principles, as previously discussed.189
The inclusion of a statement of regulatory objectives in the
FSMA was generally welcomed during the passage of the legislation, although there was, inevitably, some discussion about
whether the right objectives had been specified190 as well as a
more technical legal debate about the drafting of the relevant
provisions.191 The statutory statement of objectives represents
a brave attempt to distill the purposes of regulation across sec184. Prior to December 2001, the overhaul was not so radical at the secondtier level (i.e., in the rules made by the FSA itself). There, the emphasis was
on changes necessary to achieve consistency and simplification, rather than
on re-assessment of fundamental principles. Davies, Law and Regulation,
supra note 91, at 169.
185. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. VIII (Eng.).
186. Id. at pt. I, §§ 3–6.
187. Id. at pt. I, § 2.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
190. In particular whether there should have been a further objective, also
requiring the FSA to promote competition.
191. See JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 18–62 (providing a helpful summary of the main aspects of the debate).
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tors that traditionally may have had different focuses.192 But
whether this statement, supplemented by the regulatory principles, actually gives the FSA a clear idea of its purpose and
provides it with a workable basis on which to build a coherent
and consistent system of effective financial regulation, are major questions that will be best examined through the lens of
practical experience. At this stage it would seem sensible to
have low expectations — the breadth of the objectives and the
FSA’s wide discretion with regard to their implementation, may
mean that the objectives will prove to have limited value in
pinpointing exactly what it is that the FSA is supposed to do
and, accordingly, whether it has achieved its mandate.
A key set of issues will be those relating to the objective of
maintaining confidence in the financial system and how the
FSA’s role in this respect relates to the Bank’s continuing responsibility for the overall stability of the financial system, especially the stability of the monetary and payment financial
systems.193 Will this arrangement prove to be robust in dealing
with systemic risks or will the U.K. model validate those who
argue that the ability of a central bank to perform its role as
overseer of the financial system is undermined if it is not also
the regulator of banks and other institutions that present systemic concerns?194 For now, these are largely questions for the
192. Jackson, supra note 123, at 339–6 3 (Pt. III explores cross-sectoral
variation in U.S. financial regulation).
193. A memorandum of understanding between the FSA, the Bank of England and HM Treasury sets out their respective obligations with regard to
financial regulation, details arrangements for Bank of England access to FSA
supervisory records and sets outs procedures, in the form of monthly meetings, for cooperation between them. See Memorandum of Understanding Between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA (Oct. 28, 1997), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Documents/Financial_
Services/Regulating_Financial_Services/fin_rfs_mou.cfm.
194. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS IN
PRUDENTIAL S UPERVISION 7 (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf [hereinafter ECB, T HE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS]
(providing a recent restatement of the case for preservation of a fundamental
role in prudential supervision for national central banks, with particular reference to the eurosystem). See generally Leonardo Bartolini, The Financial
Services Authority: Structure, Mandate and Policy Issues, in HOSSEIN S AMIEI
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL M ONETARY FUND : UNITED KINGDOM E XPERIENCE (IMF
Staff Country Report No. 99/44, 1999); GROS & LANNOO , supra note 178, at
140–43.
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future,195 but it is interesting to note that some of those within
the U.K.’s financial industry who welcomed the original concept
of the single regulator in the U.K. are now beginning to revisit
the issue precisely because of concerns about the allocation of
responsibilities between the Bank and the FSA.196 The merits
of the U.K. approach with regard to the allocation of responsibilities for financial stability have also been doubted by the
European Central Bank.197
The FSA has made an inauspicious start concerning claims
about the superiority of the single regulator model on the
grounds of greater consistency in institutional approach and
shorter and simpler lines of communication and cooperation
between individual regulators. An FSA internal report on its
handling of the crisis affecting a major insurance company in
1999 and 2000 specifically identified poor communication between regulators working within different departments of the
FSA as a deficiency in regulation.198 To date, this remains the
most prominent and embarrassing example of the FSA failing
to live up to its potential as an effective single regulator; however, there have been others. A more recent example is the
criticism by influential bodies within the banking sector of the
FSA’s proposed prudential rules that, in their view, showed all
195. BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 14–15, 27–31
(considering the practical operation of this arrangement). Briault suggests
that the tripartite arrangement between the Bank, the FSA, and the Treasury
works well, although he acknowledges that “the arrangements have not yet
been put to the test in a period of massive financial instability, or of the ‘failure’ of a firm (or firms) posing a significant systemic risk.” Id. at 15. Others
are more skeptical: “The memorandum created the impression they were
working together fine, but there’s still competition and jealousy of each other’s
turf. The Bank still considers itself to have some residual authority over the
FSA.” Faisal Islam, One of our Governors is Missing: But is the Treasury
Looking in the Wrong Place to Fill the Bank of England Job?, OBSERVER, Sept.
1, 2002, at 5 (quoting Kern Alexander, Senior Fellow in International Law at
the Judge Institute, Cambridge).
196. Views of Ian Mullen, Chief Executive of the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”), as reported in BBA’s Unhelpful Criticism Of Financial Services
Authority — A Recent Speech By The Head of the British Bankers’ Association,
In Which He Lambasted The UK’s Financial Services Authority, Is Unfair On
The Super-regulator, BANKER, June 1, 2002.
197. See generally EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, T HE ROLE OF CENTRAL B ANKS
IN PRUDENTIAL S UPERVISION (2001), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf.
198. BAIRD REPORT, supra note 135, ¶ 6.2.5.
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the signs of having been drafted by specialist teams with no one
taking overall responsibility to ensure a coherent and consistent
approach.199 In the short term, the FSA can use its youthful
status and inexperience as a single regulator as an excuse for
this type of regulatory shortcoming, but explanations of that
sort will become less convincing as the regime matures.
D. A Single Regulator May be More/Less Accountable
In its simplest terms, the argument for a single regulator
case on accountability grounds is that a single regulator has no
other regulatory body to which it can transfer blame for regulatory failure.200 It is suggested that the fact that “the buck stops
here” provides the regulator with a strong incentive to establish
a clear mandate, to stick to it in its practical operations, and to
educate consumers of financial services on what protections
they can and cannot reasonably expect from the regulatory system.201 These features are connected with accountability because the more clearly the regulator’s mandate and areas of
responsibility are defined, the easier it should be for those who
are affected by its operations to hold it accountable.202 However, commentators also identify major concerns about accountability in relation to single regulators because of the allembracing nature of their role and their concentrated and potentially draconian powers.203 Can a single regulator be made
properly accountable to an industry while avoiding regulatory
capture? Can it be made properly accountable to consumers
without creating false perceptions and possible moral hazard
concerns about the extent to which the regulatory system will
protect them from financial risks? If the single regulator is independent of government, as is the case in the U.K., by what
mechanisms can it be held politically accountable in respect of
199. See Press Release, British Bankers’ Ass’n, BBA/LIBA Response to Consultation Paper 97 — The Integrated Prudential Sourcebook (Jan. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.bba.org.uk/public/newsroom/35451/42733/45188?
version=1.
200. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 152; Chris Hughes, The Buck Stops
Here, INDEP., Oct. 3, 2001, at 1.
201. GOODHART ET AL, supra note 12, at 151–52
202. LARGE , supra note 50, at 82; JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra
note 84, ¶¶ 99–146; ROBERT BALDWIN & M ARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: T HEORY , S TRATEGY , PRACTICE ch. 21 (1999).
203. GOODHART ET AL., supra note 12, at 153–54.
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its public interest functions? These questions are much debated
in the literature on regulation and the arguments are often
finely balanced. They were also major preoccupations in the
public debate in the U.K. leading up to the adoption of the single regulator model.
Industry lobbying groups made extensive use of a nightmarish vision of the FSA as an over-mighty, over-powerful bully in
their efforts to influence the content of the legislative framework from which it would derive its powers.204 Particularly, in
relation to its disciplinary and enforcement powers, lurid images of the FSA as legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one were frequently invoked.205 The
FSMA, as finally enacted, does give the FSA very extensive
powers, but there are also broad legislative control mechanisms
which are intended to act as checks and balances against the
FSA in the use of these powers.
The regulatory objectives and principles lie at the core of the
accountability mechanisms. They are relevant to public accountability (i.e. accountability to industry and consumers), political accountability, and judicial accountability since they provide all interested parties with benchmarks against which to
judge the FSA’s performance. While the statutory statement of
objectives and principles is broadly welcome as an improvement
to the accountability framework, some of the more optimistic
statements about the significance of the objectives and principles need to be viewed with care. For example, it has been suggested that the regulatory objectives and principles provide the
basis for legal accountability because “the FSA could be challenged in the courts on the grounds that it has failed to pursue
its objectives or to take the principles into account.”206 While
this statement is certainly true, cases where legal challenges
against the FSA on these grounds actually succeed are likely to
be rare. This is because the FSMA gives the FSA considerable
discretion as to how best to meet its objectives. Its duty to act
in a way that is compatible with the objectives and, for the purpose of meeting them, extends only “so far as is reasonably pos204. See Gary Parkinson, FSA Bows to Criticisms of Being Judge and Jury
in Enforcement Regime, M ONEY M ARKETING, July 8, 1999, at 2.
205. Dan Atkinson, “Judge, Jury and Executioner” Claims Defeat City Super-regulator, G UARDIAN, July 6, 1999, at 22; Parkinson, supra note 204, at 2.
206. BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 12.
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sible.”207 It is for the FSA itself to decide on the “most appropriate” way in which to meet the objectives.208 Further, the obligations of the FSA with regard to the objectives only arise in relation to its “general functions” — its functions in making rules,
issuing codes, and giving general guidance considered as a
whole and its function of determining general policy and principles.209 Similarly, the FSA is only required to “have regard” to
the regulatory principles and, as with the objectives, this duty
only arises in relation to the discharge of its general functions.210 This careful drafting ensures that there is no mechanism for challenging individual rules or decisions on the
grounds that they are incompatible with the objectives or principles. The qualified and self-referential nature of the duties
regarding the regulatory objectives and principles appears
likely to hamper the effectiveness of judicial review in practice.
Similar caution is appropriate at this stage in relation to
other, more detailed, accountability mechanisms provided for in
relation to the FSA because they have only been fully operative
for a short period of time. Some important aspects are largely
untested. For example the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (“Tribunal”), which is an independ ent review body to
which certain FSA decisions can be referred, has not yet heard
a case through to completion. The provisions for the Tribunal in
the legislative framework211 are intended to assuage concerns
about the all-embracing role of the FSA as judge, jury, etc, and
to meet human rights-related concerns about the availability of
independent, fair trials.212 It has been envisaged that over time
this Tribunal will play a key role in relation to FSA accountability.213 However, the public nature of the Tribunal proceedings
may in practice deter people from challenging FSA decisions via
this route because of fears about adverse reputational consequences, even if the challenge is successful.
207. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2 (Eng.).
208. Id. § 2(1)(b).
209. Id. § 2(4).
210. Id. § 2(3)–(4).
211. Id. pt. IX.
212. Thomas A. Beazley, Holding the Balance — Effective Enforcement,
Procedural Fairness and Human Rights, in REGULATING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY , supra note 48, at 115–26.
213. FRESHFIELDS
B RUCKHAUS
DERINGER,
FINANCIAL
S ERVICES:
INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 255 (2001). [hereinafter F RESHFIELDS].
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The FSA Chairman has claimed that the “prime accountability route” for the FSA will be through Ministers to Parliament,214 but some commentators have doubted how effective
political accountability will be in relation to the FSA.215 The
FSA is an unusual hybrid. It is a private company limited by
guarantee and its operations are funded entirely by industry
levy.216 However, the government exercises control in that the
Treasury appoints the FSA board,217 can order independent reviews of its financial affairs,218 and can commission independent
inquiries into regulatory failures.219 The Treasury, however,
cannot intervene directly in the affairs of the FSA, save in very
limited circumstances concerned with competition policy.220 The
FSA must make an annual report to the Treasury.221 The
Treasury must put the FSA’s report before Parliament.222 FSA
officials can also be ordered to appear before a parliamentary
select committee in accordance with the usual procedures of the
Houses of Parliament.223 In practice, the Treasury Select Committee routinely takes evidence from the FSA twice a year, once
on its plan and budget for the coming year, and once on its annual report for the previous year. It can also hold inquiries
from time to time as it sees fit.224 Views on whether the system
of appearing before the Treasury Select Committee is likely to
prove an effective form of accountability to Parliament, are
mixed. Although the IMF considers that appearances by financial agency officials before a designated public authority — such
as a parliamentary committee — promote accountability, especially when the agencies are granted a high degree of auton-

214. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, at Minutes of Evidence
¶ 2 (question 2, reply by Davies, Chairman FSA).
215. See, e.g., Page, supra note 176, at 132–33.
216. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 13–14, 17 (Eng.).
217. Id. § 1.
218. Id. § 12.
219. Id. § 14.
220. Id. § 308.
221. Id. sched. 1, § 10. The Treasury can direct the FSA with regard to the
contents of the report.
222. Id. § 10(3).
223. Id. §§ 4–5.
224. Id. § 14.
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omy,225 others doubt this.226 So far, the evidence indicates that
appearing before the Treasury Select Committee can be a very
uncomfortable short-term experience for FSA officials.227 But
long-term studies will be needed to establish whether this process has meaningful impact.
With regard to public accountability, the FSMA provides for a
variety of consultation and disclosure requirements. The FSA
is required to engage in public consultations before exercising
rulemaking powers, including publication of rules in draft form
accompanied by cost-benefit analysis.228 The FSA has a general
obligation to establish and maintain arrangements for consultation with consumers and practitioners.229 This gives statutory
backing to the arrangements that had previously operated in
practice, whereby the FSA consulted with a Consumer Panel
and a Practitioner Panel.230 The FSA must have regard to any
representations made by either of the panels and, if it disagrees, it must give a written statement of its reasons for doing
so.231
Again, it is too early to test how well these requirements are
working. There are some indications of dissatisfaction with the
practical operation of the public consultation requirements,
225. INTERNATIONAL M ONETARY FUND, CODE OF G OOD PRACTICES ON
TRANSPARENCY IN M ONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES: DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES 13 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/
mft/code/eng/code2e.pdf.
226. Page, supra note 176, at 134–35.
227. As this selection of headlines from the press coverage of Davies’ appearances before the Select Committee with regard to the Equitable Life crisis
illustrates. Katherine Griffiths, MPs Attack Davies Over Equitable Life Crisis, INDEP., Oct. 31, 2001, at 17; Nina Montagu-Smith, FSA Role Puzzles Equitable Inquiry, D AILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2001, at 36; FSA Denies Collusion
with Equitable, INDEP., Nov. 14, 2001, at 21; Davies to Face Second Grilling,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2001, at 28.
228. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 65 (Eng.) (guidelines
for drafting statements or codes that the Authority may issue describing conduct expected of approved persons); id. § 121 (guidelines for drafting codes
that the Authority must issue to give guidance for determining whether behavior amounts to market abuse); id. § 155 (guidelines for drafting rules under the Authority’s general rule-making powers).
229. Id. §§ 8–9.
230. See id. §§ 9(1), 10(1); Press Release, FSA, Practitioner and Consumer
Panels Go Statutory (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
press/2001/073.html.
231. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8, § 11 (Eng.).
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largely because of the sheer bulk of consultation material that
the FSA has issued in the past few years, and the resources
that have gone into responding to it.232 Given the ambitious
nature of the single regulator project in the U.K., it is hard to
see how a large and costly consultation process could have been
avoided, though it undoubtedly did generate “consultation fatigue.”233 However, if discontent about the burdens on industry
and consumers, which are associated with the consultation requirements, does not diminish as the regime becomes more established, this could indicate a serious flaw within the system.
The system will also have failed if the FSA develops a reputation for not listening to the criticisms expressed by those who
respond to consultation exercises. The FSA will always be vulnerable to this charge, but time and experience will help to distinguish well-founded claims from exaggerated claims made to
garner media attention for the self-interested views of a particular group or sector.234
Is the independence of the practitioner and consumer panels
liable to be compromised because of their position within the
formal institutional framework? To be sure, these panels are
established by the FSA, the FSA board appoints the me mbers,
and it also funds their operation.235 Moreover, the Consumer
Panel, which operates more formally and publicly than the
Practitioner Panel, is dependent on FSA staff for its secre232. Jill Treanor FSA “Less Effective” Than Predecessors G UARDIAN (London), Nov. 29, 2002, at 30; BBC News, FSA World’s “Most Accountable Regulator” (Dec. 3, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2539001.stm.
233. INQUIRY INTO THE FINANCIAL S ERVICES ASSOCIATION ’S P RACTITIONER
PANEL BEFORE THE S ELECT COMMITTEE ON T REASURY (2002), at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/
cmtreasy/600/2020503.htm (statement of Donald Brydon, Chairman of the
Practitioner Panel & Chairman and Chief Executive of AXA Investment Managers) [hereinafter INQUIRY INTO THE FSA’S PRACTITIONER PANEL].
234. CSFI, WAKING UP TO THE FSA, supra note 128, at 13 (noting complaints
from industry participants that their comments have been ignored by the FSA
but suggests that this criticism is not altogether fair). The Consumers Association has also accused the FSA of failing to listen to objections about FSA
proposals for new rules on the way financial products are sold to investors.
Teresa Hunter, Consumer Group Savages FSA Plans: CA Says Adviser Reforms will be Confusing and Add to Costs, S UNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 28, 2002,
at 4; William Kay, Consumers Rip into FSA Proposals, INDEP., Apr. 27, 2002,
at 1.
235. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 1(9)–(10) (Eng.).
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tariat.236 All of these features suggest that the panels may
struggle to achieve and maintain independence.237 A report in
The Observer on the Consumer Panel’s annual report encapsulates the issue neatly with the comment: “Brown [chair of the
Consumer Panel] remains confident and hopeful that the FSA
can clean up the financial services industry. His own job depends on it, after all.”238 The counterargument is that the close
links should facilitate constructive and better-informed dialogue between the FSA and the panels. The structure is, then,
best viewed as a compromise between true arms-length independence, and privileged access to FSA information and personnel. Whether the optimal trade-offs have been made will be
a question for future study.
V. A CONCLUSION AND SOME OBSERVATIONS
The U.K. embraced the single regulator concept in an ambitious way. It decided to bring many different regulatory agencies together into one single institution. Moreover, it decided to
place its single regulator within a new, properly-integrated, legal framework, rather than simply giving it the powers that had
been previously enjoyed by former regimes, which were divided
by sector through a process of stitching together or consolidating existing legislation. Creating the new integrated legal
framework was a massive, complex, and time -consuming exercise. Moreover, it was often highly controversial. But, in the
end, it was done239 and when the new system finally became
fully operational, it happened smoothly without disruption to
the markets.
Accordingly, one definite conclusion that can be drawn from
the U.K. experience is that, if the political will is present, major
reform of this type can actually be accomplished and e ffectuated
236. Id. ¶ 1(10).
237. The Treasury Select Committee has expressed some concerns about the
panel’s lack of financial independence and the FSA’s control over the selection
processes. INQUIRY INTO THE FSA’S PRACTITIONER P ANEL, supra note 233
(Question by Mr. Tyrie, Question 15; Question by Mr. Mudie, Questions 45–
48; Question by Mr. Laws, Questions 89–90).
238. Maria Scott, Cash: Incredible: “This Reckless Greed”: Watchdog Attacks
Industry Where “Consumer is a Dirty Word,” O BSERVER, May 19, 2002, at 2.
239. Although details of the new legal regime at the level of the FSA Handbook are still to be overhauled. Davies, Law and Regulation, supra note 91, at
171–72.
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within a mature, major international financial center. The U.K.
experience also provides support for the intuitive assessment
that political support for change will be greater where the existing system is, or is perceived to be, malfunctioning. Beyond
this, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions, because the new
regime is still in its infancy. Yet there are certainly many positive signs, in particular, the emphasis on an integrated approach to regulation across all parts of the financial services
industry.
One interesting feature of the recent British experience with
financial regulation is the extent to which the character of its
new regime has been associated with its first Chairman, Howard Davies. It is hard to tell whether, or to what extent, the
degree of identification of the new regime with a single individual is related to the unitary structure of the FSA, but there may
be a significant connection. Arguments for the adoption of the
single regulator model include economies of scale through unified management and staffing, and greater effectiveness
through the development of a single, institutionalized approach
to regulation. A corollary of these arguments is that managerial power will be concentrated in relatively few individuals.
Thus, those at the very top of the structure should be in a particularly strong position to dominate the culture and institution. Questions about governance and structure are particularly important because the single regulator model is characterized by a regulatory regime vulnerable to the personal influence
of a few individuals. Whether the FSA should have a separate
chairman and chief executive is an issue that was sidestepped
in relation to Davies because he was already in office by the
time the question became a topic for public debate.240 However,
in a broad sense, the FSMA now requires the FSA to have regard to corporate governance principles.241 Although the significance of the FSA’s status as a company should not be taken
too far, principles developed in the corporate sector to avoid the
potential adverse effects of domination by one individual could,
with suitable adaptation for the regulatory context, be useful as

240. JOINT COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra note 84, ¶¶ 112–13.
241. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 7 (Eng.). The duty is
to have regard to such principles “as it is reasonable to regard as applicable to
it.” Id.
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a way of addressing the potential problem of concentration of
influence within the unitary FSA regime.
A potentially worrying sign emanating from the top of the
FSA is the continuing enthusiasm for further legal change.
Rather than giving its own staff, and everyone else, breathing
space in which to work with the new regime, the FSA has declared itself to be a “reforming authority” and has announced “a
considerable programme of reform to many parts of our rulebook.”242 This reforming zeal can be defended on the grounds
that the process of fundamental legal reform that began in 1997
with the announcement of the proposal to adopt the single regulator model, is still incomplete because the review of the lowertier rules, i.e. those in the FSA Handbook, that took place in the
transitional period, was intended to achieve consistency and
simplification rather than to re-think fundamental principles.
Furthermore, standing still for a long time is not a sensible
strategy in financial regulation because the system needs to
evolve if it is not to lag too far behind developments in the market. But, while ossification of the system clearly would be in no one’s interests, the FSA needs to be careful not to act excessively in the pursuit of the goal of integrated regulation.
In the sometimes-fevered debate that surrounded the enac tment of the FSMA, the prospect of the FSA using its disciplinary and enforcement powers excessively tended to attract the
most attention. Those fears have receded, partly, but not exclusively,243 because of legal intervention in the form of procedural
safeguards and, in particular, the establishment of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal. At present, there appears
to be a reasonable degree of confidence in the robustness of
these controls on the FSA’s disciplinary powers,244 although this
confidence has not yet been properly tested under the pressure
of practical, and perhaps controversial , experience. As a lawmaker, the FSA is subject to looser forms of control, principally
in the form of consultation and disclosure requirements, includ242. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, A NNUAL REPORT 5 (2001/2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar01_02.pdf.
243. Changes in personnel at the top of the FSA enforcement division have
also been thought to have played a part. In 2001, the head of the FSA’s enforcement division was switched to a different position within the organization.
244. See, e.g., F RESHFIELDS, supra note 213, at 255.
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ing cost-benefit analysis, underpinned by its obligations with
regard to statutory regulatory principles and objectives. How
effective these controls will be is open to speculation, but it
seems unlikely that they would prevent a drift towards a more
legalistic and bureaucratic approach if that is the direction in
which those in charge of the maturing FSA choose to take it.
But how much freedom will the FSA actually have to shape
its own destiny as a rule-maker? A powerful constraint on the
FSA’s rule-making discretion is its obligation to give effect to
EC law.245 Significant parts of the FSA Handbook already reflect EC rules on banking, insurance, and securities regulation.246 And the EC influence is increasing as central EC institutions vigorously pursue the goal of full financial integration.247 There is a trend away from the established approach of
minimum harmonization — where the minimum requirements
are set at central EC level, but with discretion for me mber
states to impose stricter requirements (sometimes known as
“super-equivalence”) towards maximum harmonization, where
no deviation from the rules set by the central EC authorities is
permitted.248 Current trends suggest that national regulatory
authorities of the EC member states will increasingly find their
autonomy with regard to rulemaking eroded by obligations to
give effect to requirements that have been set at EC level.
Their role seems likely to shift from that of direct legislator to
that of participant in the process whereby rules are developed
at EC level.249 The goal of ensuring consistency across member
245. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 148, 410 (Eng.).
246. See FSA HANDBOOK , available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook (last
modified Mar. 3, 2003)
247. H. Onno Ruding, Vice Chairman, Citibank, Remarks at the Sixth
European Financial Markets Convention in Brussels (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.fese.be/initiatives/speeches/2002/efmc2002_ruding_
speech.htm.
248. FINANCIAL S ERVICES AUTHORITY, REVIEW OF THE LISTING REGIME ¶¶ 3.5–
3.25 (July 2002) (discussing European developments and the controversy that
the switch towards maximum harmonization has provoked with reference to
the ability of national regulatory authorities to impose corporate governance
or other qualitative standards beyond those that have been mandated at the
European level).
249. Under the Lamfalussy principles national regulators are involved in
standard-setting at Level 2 — i.e., filling in the technical details of framework
legislation that has been agreed (at Level 1) by the main EC legislative organs. For an overview of the Lamfalussy principles, see Guido Ferrarini, Pan-
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states would suggest that the EC rules are likely to be increasingly prescriptive with little interpretative discretion or waiver
powers being allowed to individual national regulators.250 So,
even though the direct focus of the increasing EC activity is on
standard-setting, it seems also likely to affect the day-to-day
supervisory relationships between national regulators and
regulated firms with regard, for example, to questions of interpretation of particular rules, and/or their application to particular facts, or to applications for rule-waivers in particular circumstances.
Some commentators go further and suggest that the EC is
moving inexorably towards the establishment of new panEuropean regulatory agencies that would perform the full range
of regulatory and supervisory functions, including enforcement.251 This debate has been particularly active in the secur ities field where the prospect of a European-Securities and Exchange Commission (“Euro-SEC”) is much discussed.252 It
might be said that a shift of regulatory and supervisory powers
from national to regional agencies is the logical next stage beyond regulatory consolidation at the national level, as a step in
a process that would lead ultimately to the establishment of a
single worldwide regulator. Even within Europe, which leads
the world in the process of regional financial integration, it
seems unlikely in the short-to-medium term that the FSA, or
other national regulators, will be replaced by a single Euroregulator or even (since EC regulation is still largely constructed along sectoral lines) by a group of sectorally-divided
Euro-regulators. Banking might look like the most obvious
candidate for the assumption of a full regulatory and supervisory role by European institutions but the European Central
Bank, which is responsible for monetary policy within the euro
European Securities Markets: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses, 3 EUR.
BUS . ORG . L. REV . § 2.3 (2002).
250. Level 3 of the Lamfalussy principles aims to encourage cooperation and
networking between national regulators to ensure consistent and equivalent
application of the rules. The recently-established Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) is to play a key role in issuing guidelines, joint
interpretative guidance and so forth. See id.
251. NIAMH M OLONEY, EC S ECURITIES REGULATION 896–97 (Francis G. Jacobs ed., 2002). Chapter 15 provides an admirable summary of the arguments
for and against EC centralized regulation and supervision.
252. Id. at 843–97.
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area, has recently affirmed that the division of responsibilities
between itself and national authorities “would seem appropriate to tackle the changes triggered by the introduction of the
euro.”253 Public policy debate on fundamental questions about
the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of superEuropean regulatory and supervisory agencies is starting but,
as yet, it is at an early stage.254
However things develop, it seems beyond doubt that in the
short-to-medium term, the drive for further regulatory changes
affecting the financial sector will come from Europe. It remains
to be seen whether the U.K. will be in a strong position to influence change at that level because it has already been through
radical upheaval domestically, or whether the U.K. will be
found to have made a major strategic mistake by being inwardlooking at a time when major reform initiatives were beginning
to take shape at the European level. Domestically, although
political challenges to the existence of the FSA are always possible, no major political party is likely to espouse the case for
further radical, expensive, and disruptive change unless either
the FSA fails to deliver the benefits claimed for the single regulator model or that model becomes wholly inappropriate because of changing market conditions. The latter point has particular current relevance because the general economic climate
and specific events such as WorldCom and Enron have highlighted the particularly acute conflict of interest problems that
can arise within financial supermarkets. These events have
added an extra dimension to the debate about the advantages of
the “universal banking” business model.255 “Deconglomeration”
253. ECB, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS , supra note 194, at 7.
254. See, e.g., Chris Bates, Models for European Regulation: Euro-SEC,
Euro-FSA or Lamfalussy?, 17 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN . L AW 151 (2002); Jeroen
Kremers et al., Does Europe Need a Euro-wide Supervisor?, 6 FIN. REG. 50
(2001).
255. Thanks a Bundle — The Model of a Vast, Integrated Financial Firm is
Fast Going Out of Favour, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 2002, at 12; Wilmarth, supra
note 113, at 272–312, 437–44 (discussing disappointing results achieved by
banks resulting from big bank mergers). Wilmarth doubts the ability of big,
complex financial institutions to produce positive synergies of scale or scope.
Id. at 438. Further he suggests that arguments used in relation to disenchantment with conglomeration in the industrial sector (e.g., that managers
are motivated to build large companies for self interested reasons rather than
in pursuit of better returns for investors) are also applicable to the financial
sector. Id. at 284–85.
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within the financial sector could occur as it did previously in the
industrial sector. If firms were to retreat back to the safety of
traditional sectorally-divided business, claims about the good
“fit” of the single regulator model to the nature of regulated
markets and firms would become increasingly hollow.
Time and experience should provide some answers to que stions and concerns about the single regulator model that have
been raised in this article. The U.K. will now be a valuable
source of data on whether, or in what ways, the single regulator
model is superior to alternative models of regulation, in terms
of suitability, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. Practical operation of the new regime will also shed light on the robustness of an ambitious, tailor-made, legislative framework
that was designed expressly to help secure the potential benefits of the single regulator model and avoid its possible drawbacks.256

256. See BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE , supra note 141, at 11 (identifying the U.K.’s integrated legislative framework as being a particular advantage).

